

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

August 11, 2026
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BPC # 26-185

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General, Police Commission

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL
WEAPONS AND TACTICS OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDED ACTION

REVIEW and APPROVE the Inspector General's Report on its Review of the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Weapons and Tactics Operations.

DISCUSSION

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a focused review of the Los Angeles Police Department's (Department) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) platoon. The review examined SWAT's operational protocols, tactical decision-making, documentation practices, compliance with professional standards, and operational outcomes across three primary categories of activity: unplanned call-outs, planned operations, and Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT)-only responses. Based on its findings, the OIG identified opportunities to strengthen operational consistency, documentation, and oversight, and presents recommendations for the Board's consideration.

I am available to provide any information the Board may require.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matthew Barragan", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

MATTHEW BARRAGAN
Inspector General
Police Commission

Attachment

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

**REVIEW OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS
OPERATIONS**



Conducted by the
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Matthew Barragán

Inspector General

August 11, 2026

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REVIEW OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS OPERATIONS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between January and August 2025, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a focused review of the operational protocols, tactical execution, and administrative recordkeeping practices of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD or Department) Metropolitan (Metro) Division “D Platoon,” commonly known as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT). Within the Department, SWAT serves a critical and highly specialized role, responding to incidents that exceed the capabilities of standard patrol personnel. These situations typically involve armed barricaded suspects, hostage crises, high-risk warrant service, counterterrorism operations, dignitary protection, and other encounters involving individuals who pose a significant threat to public safety.

SWAT differs from other LAPD units because it concentrates on tactical intervention and strategic resolution rather than routine patrol or investigative work. Officers assigned to SWAT undergo a rigorous selection process and receive extensive training, enabling them to operate effectively in complex and high-pressure scenarios. Their mission is to resolve volatile incidents safely while minimizing the risk of harm to officers, suspects, and community members.¹

This report is the second installment in a series examining key aspects of SWAT.² It focuses on SWAT’s decision-making protocols and operational deployments. The OIG assessed three primary categories of SWAT activity:

- (1) Unplanned call-outs, including barricaded suspects and hostage rescues.
- (2) Planned operations, such as high-risk search and arrest warrant services.
- (3) Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT)-only responses, which typically involve non-criminal or low-level offenses, often centered on suicide intervention with the option to disengage.

Although SWAT engages in a broader array of missions, this review intentionally focuses on these high-frequency, high-impact scenarios. The report evaluates SWAT’s decision making, operational strategies, documentation practices, compliance with professional standards, tactical responses, operational effectiveness, and overall outcomes.

The OIG reached the following findings and offers the corresponding recommendations.

LOW USE OF FORCE

Findings:

SWAT’s use of force—both less-lethal and lethal—remains notably low in the incidents reviewed by the OIG and in the Department’s ten-year review of SWAT operations. This consistent pattern reflects the unit’s disciplined and measured approach to resolving high-risk situations. SWAT

¹ 2020 SWAT Guidebook, Section 040, page 1.

² The OIG conducted a review of SWAT Training from November 2024 through April 2025 and intends to review the SWAT selection process in 2026.

prioritizes de-escalation and negotiation and employs tactics designed to minimize the use of force whenever possible. Even in incidents involving armed or barricaded suspects, SWAT demonstrates restraint and a clear intent to resolve situations without resorting to force unless necessary. This finding underscores the team's alignment with Department policy emphasizing the preservation of life.

When force is used, SWAT integrates Tactical Emergency Medical Services (TEMS) and Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel into operations to ensure immediate medical care if injuries occur. In the eight incidents observed by the OIG, TEMS personnel monitored suspects in custody for potential injuries and provided prompt medical attention when needed. Before deploying chemical agents, SWAT consistently consulted with CNT and Behavioral Science Services (BSS) to confirm that negotiations had reached an impasse, and coordinated with LAFD personnel to assess potential fire risks. When LAFD personnel determined that a particular chemical agent posed a heightened ignition risk, SWAT adjusted its tactics to mitigate that risk. This collaborative approach reflects SWAT's commitment to minimizing harm and safeguarding all involved.

Recommendation: None

TACTICAL TOOLS

Findings:

The OIG observed that SWAT's ability to resolve critical incidents with minimal force is supported by its effective deployment of a wide array of tactical tools. These include less-lethal devices, armored vehicles, chemical agents, aerial support, and negotiation platforms such as the CNT. By using specialized equipment and support resources tailored to each situation, SWAT maximizes operational control and minimizes the likelihood of injury to officers, suspects, and the public. This comprehensive tactical toolkit enables SWAT to maintain a strategic advantage without escalating to higher levels of force.

The integration of drones provides real-time intelligence and visibility, helping SWAT supervisors and Incident Commanders make informed tactical decisions while reducing risk to personnel. The availability and coordinated use of these tools demonstrate SWAT's ability to adapt its tactics to changing conditions while maintaining a strong focus on preserving life.

However, during SWAT training, the OIG observed that not all officers were equipped with the same Department-issued Night Optical Devices (NODs). Some officers were issued higher-quality NODs than others. Because all SWAT officers are tasked with critical decision making during operations, the Department should ensure that all SWAT officers are uniformly equipped with high-quality NODs to ensure operational effectiveness and safety.

Recommendation 1:

Ensure all SWAT officers use the same high-quality NODs.

AFTER-ACTION REPORT

Findings:

Although SWAT's After-Action Report (AAR) system is extensive and designed to capture a broad range of operational data, the OIG identified opportunity for improvement.

During high-risk warrant operations, SWAT generates a digital operations plan and distributes hard copies to team members during briefings. But the current Warrant AAR portal cannot upload or attach the digital plan to the corresponding report. As a result, hard copies must be stored in file cabinets, creating duplicative recordkeeping and inefficiencies. Allowing digital operations plans to be uploaded and linked directly to the Warrant AAR would improve efficiency, accessibility, and document retention, while strengthening oversight and audit functions.

The OIG also noted inconsistencies in how certain fields, such as CNT outcomes, are completed across different sections of the report. A more structured validation process, along with post-approval locking mechanisms, would strengthen the credibility and analytical value of the AAR system. Enhancing data accuracy will ultimately support better oversight, training, and accountability.

Recommendation 2:

Enhance the SWAT warrant AAR online portal by adding a feature that allows the upload of supporting documents.

DEPLOYMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Findings:

SWAT's deployment decision-making process is thorough and well-structured, incorporating multiple layers of oversight and approval. Deployment requests must pass through several levels of command review, including the Incident Commander (IC), the requesting Area Captain, and the Metro Captain.

A key component of tactical decision making rests with the Element Leader (Police Officer [PO] III+1), who develops the tactical plan for each operation. Element Leaders serve as subject-matter experts within SWAT and play a vital role in planning, decision making, training, and leadership, ensuring that tactical strategies are sound, safe, and consistent with Department standards. SWAT is currently understaffed by four Element Leader positions and expects additional vacancies because of upcoming retirements.

This multilayered authorization process helps ensure that SWAT resources are deployed only when clearly justified. Close coordination among the SWAT Officer-in-Charge (OIC), supervisors, and requesting Area command staff promotes transparency, accountability, and operational discipline. It is also aligned with Incident Command System (ICS) best practices. In

all spontaneous deployments reviewed by the OIG, a Bureau Commander or Deputy Chief was present and served as IC, holding ultimate authority over tactical decisions. However, during the OIG's observation of a pre-planned high-risk arrest warrant operation, the requesting Area Captain or a higher-ranking officer was not present.

Recommendation 3:

Fill the four Element Leader positions to maintain operational needs and ensure consistent leadership.

Recommendation 4:

Reinforce the expectation that the requesting Captain or bureau Staff Officer be present during all SWAT operations.

TECHNOLOGY

Findings:

Many operational and administrative processes still rely on hard-copy documentation and lack modern technological enhancements, limiting SWAT's ability to exercise real-time command and control.

Providing access to the AAR through an online portal would improve the efficiency of preparing, submitting, and reviewing reports. During operational breaks at the Command Post (CP), designated SWAT personnel could use this time to input data directly into the AAR.

The OIG suggests considering integrating live video feeds from Bearcat-mounted cameras and exterior drones. These feeds would provide critical visual information during operations and enable command staff at the CP to make more informed tactical decisions in real time. Modernizing these systems would improve tactical coordination and officer safety. The OIG further suggests expanding the use of technology platforms such as the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), which is already used by other tactical units nationwide.³ ATAK provides real-time situational awareness by allowing officers and command staff to track the personnel locations, view operational updates, and share intelligence seamlessly.

Recommendation 5:

Host the AAR through an online portal with access provided on portable digital devices, allowing SWAT personnel to enter data during operational breaks at the CP.

³ The Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) is a geospatial and situational awareness application developed by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. ATAK provides users with high-resolution, interactive maps that support both online and offline operations. It enables users to view terrain, infrastructure, and other critical geospatial data with sub-meter accuracy. The application allows for real-time tracking of officer positions, enhancing coordination and decision making during missions.

II. BACKGROUND AND SWAT ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW

LAPD SWAT, housed within Metro Division as “D Platoon,” is a specialized tactical unit tasked with resolving high-risk incidents that exceed the capabilities of frontline patrol and other officers. The unit operates under a guiding philosophy that prioritizes the preservation of life, strategic de-escalation, and resolution with minimal use of force, principles that directly counter common public perceptions of excessive militarization. SWAT’s core responsibilities include hostage rescues, responses to armed barricaded suspects, service of high-risk search warrants, interventions involving suicidal subjects, and other complex tactical operations. LAPD SWAT is a full-time, dedicated unit that responds to more than 150 incidents annually. Officers assigned to the unit do not perform routine patrol or investigative duties except when temporarily reassigned for crime-suppression efforts.

LAPD SWAT is widely recognized as a leader within the law enforcement community. The unit’s professionalism is grounded in core guiding principles that continue to define its operational standards. They are:

- *A commitment to the belief that members must function as a team, and that the overall success of each mission is a direct result of individual team members acting in concert with one another.*
- *A deep and abiding reverence for human life, resulting in a firm resolve that all possible tactical alternatives be exhausted before employing deadly force.*
- *Recognition that the team is part of a larger organization, the Department, and that its level of success is depended, in large measure, on the support of the Department and the individual entities within.*
- *A conviction that consistent and intensive training is tantamount to continued success in all operational aspects of the team.*
- *An enduring effort by each team member to maintain high standards of mental and physical fitness.*
- *A continuing process of honest introspection into the day-to-day workings of this elite unit in order to guard against complacency and mediocrity.*⁴

LAPD SWAT prides itself on being a “lifesaving” unit, and it is important to emphasize that its use of force policy is identical to that of all Department personnel. Additionally, final tactical authority rests with the requesting-Area IC, who is typically a rank of Captain or above and not a member of Metro Division.

⁴ 2020 SWAT Guidebook, page 2.

A. OVERVIEW OF SWAT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

At the time of this report, SWAT maintained a total of eight POs III+1⁵ (Element Leader, with four additional positions currently vacant) and 48 PO III (Element Members). The platoon is structured into six squads, each composed of two elements.

Each element consists of one PO III+1 serving as the Element Leader and four POs III. This configuration results in two five-officer elements per squad, supporting a deployment model that emphasizes teamwork, contingency capabilities, and specialized coordination during tactical operations. Within each squad, the senior Element Leader and their team are designated as the “Red” Element, while the junior Element Leader and their team comprise the “Blue” Element. Each squad is overseen by a Sergeant II supervisor/Squad Leader, who manages both the Red and Blue Elements.

Additionally, an administrative sergeant position exists within the platoon; however, it is currently vacant, as noted in the OIG’s SWAT Training report.⁶ Command oversight is provided by two SWAT OICs at the Lieutenant II level. In the absence of a SWAT OIC, the senior Squad Leader assumes responsibility for day-to-day operations. The organizational structure of the SWAT team is illustrated in Figure 1, which outlines the chain of command and element leadership roles.

⁵ The career progression within the LAPD begins with the entry-level position of PO I, assigned to all new recruits at the Academy. Upon completing their probation, officers automatically advance to the PO II paygrade—note that this is a paygrade, not a rank. Some may further progress to PO III based on additional qualifications or duties. The term “promotion” is specifically used to describe the advancement from one Civil Service classification to another, such as moving from Police Officer to Detective or Sergeant, based on an eligible list formulated by the Personnel Department through a Civil Service examination. An “assignment to a higher pay grade” involves taking on a role with greater responsibilities or more expertise, without a change in Civil Service classification. Examples include advancing from a PO II to a PO III in roles such as a Field Training Officer (FTO). These assignments are generally the result of internal selection procedures within the LAPD. Element Leader (+1)—also referred to as the Assistant Squad Leader—is a seasoned SWAT team member who demonstrates leadership beyond tactical expertise or contributions to platoon effectiveness and evolution. This individual serves as a credible peer leader who supports and reinforces the authority of the squad leader or sergeant.

⁶ “Review of LAPD’s Special Weapons and Tactics Training,” presented to the Board of Police Commissioners on December 9, 2025.

Figure 1: Organizational Chart of the SWAT Team

Lieutenant II Officer-In-Charge +					
Lieutenant II Assistant Officer-In-Charge					
20 Squad	30 Squad	40 Squad	50 Squad	60 Squad	70 Squad
Sergeant II Squad Leader	Sergeant II Squad Leader	Sergeant II Squad Leader	Sergeant II Squad Leader	Sergeant II Squad Leader	Sergeant II Squad Leader
<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Red Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader
–	–	–	–	–	–
4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members
<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader	<i>Blue Element:</i> PO III +1 Element Leader
–	–	–	–	–	–
4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members	4 x PO III Element Members

B. SWAT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

SWAT personnel have various roles and responsibilities. Many additional personnel also serve the SWAT team, such as armorers, detectives, K-9, TEMS, and are part of the SWAT deployment package; however, they are not involved in the law enforcement and tactical resolution. The list below describes the central members of SWAT.

SWAT OIC/Assistant OIC – SWAT is led by two Lieutenants who share command responsibilities: one serves as the primary OIC, while the other functions in a supporting role (Assistant OIC). Together, they manage daily operations and provide strategic oversight of all SWAT activities. The OIC is charged with authorizing deployments and making key tactical decisions during critical incidents. One Lieutenant is assigned to be on call each day, with the OIC and Assistant OIC rotating that responsibility. Either the designated OIC or the Assistant OIC is present at every deployment to supervise and coordinate the operation. Both hold the rank of Lieutenant II and work collaboratively to lead the platoon.

Squad Leader – Each Squad Leader holds the rank of Sergeant II and is responsible for supervising a ten-member squad, which is further divided into two five-officer elements. In their leadership role, Squad Leaders oversee tactical operations, including containment positions, entry teams, sniper placements, and intelligence gathering. They are actively engaged in operations, typically entering with the team, and maintaining a position to provide real-time

guidance and leadership. In addition to tactical responsibilities, Squad Leaders conduct operational briefings and debriefings, address supervisory and disciplinary matters, and provide performance feedback.

Element Leader – Element Leaders are POs III+1 who bring advanced tactical expertise and serve as key decision-makers during deployments. Operating under the direction of a Squad Leader, they coordinate personnel positioning, contribute to tactical planning, and help shape the strategic direction of each mission. They identify safe approach routes, recommend points of entry, and assist in developing the overall tactical plan.

Beyond field operations, Element Leaders are responsible for planning and leading the execution of high-risk search and arrest warrants. They assign team roles and direct officer movement throughout each phase of the operation. They also participate in specialized assignments such as dignitary protection and crime suppression missions. In terms of training, Element Leaders lead daily SWAT drills, providing instruction and maintaining the team's operational readiness.

They are further tasked with managing logistics—such as acquiring breaching doors, coordinating with other SWAT teams for training venues, and maintaining inter-agency partnerships. When training tools or equipment are damaged, Element Leaders develop solutions for repair or replacement to ensure minimal disruption to unit readiness.

Element Member – Element Members are POs III who execute frontline tactical duties during SWAT operations. Their responsibilities include breaching, room entries, containment, sniper coverage, suspect apprehension, deployment of chemical agents, and participation in CNT operations. They may also relieve patrol officers at a scene and assist in maintaining control of the crisis environment. Element Members carry out the operational plans developed by SWAT leadership, including the OIC, Squad Leaders, and Element Leaders.

In addition to the squads and elements, SWAT enhances its operational versatility by maintaining specialty cadres, where select SWAT officers receive additional training and responsibilities. These include:

- Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT)
- Snipers/Advanced Precision Marksmen
- Climbing Cadre
- Explosive Breachers
- Tactical Waterborne
- Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT)/Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) – LAPD Paramedics
- Defensive Tactics
- Firearms Training
- Counter-Terror Cadre/Contaminated Environment Searches
- Drones/Electronics Techs
- Heavy Equipment Operators

ON-CALL

To maintain continuous readiness during off-hours, SWAT implements a structured on-call staffing model that ensures rapid and comprehensive deployment capability. This includes not only tactical response but also critical support services such as mental health and medical assistance. SWAT personnel assigned to on-call status remain available to respond to emergencies outside of regular “business” hours and are required to arrive on scene promptly. SWAT’s working hours are from 1000 hours to 1900 hours, based on data analysis showing that most call-outs occur and resolve during this time.⁷

While on call, officers are strictly prohibited from consuming alcohol or any substance that may impair their judgment or decision making. To enable a swift response, each SWAT officer is issued a Department vehicle equipped with specialized gear, allowing for immediate deployment. Officers respond to incidents Code-three—with emergency lights and sirens activated—while maintaining a strict obligation to prioritize public safety. The number of officers activated for any given response is determined by the SWAT OIC based on the nature and scope of the incident.

The following personnel and resources are maintained on stand-by⁸ for 24/7 deployment:⁹

- SWAT OIC or Assistant OIC (Lieutenant)
- SWAT Sergeant II (Tactics – preferably two)
- SWAT Sergeant II (CNT)
- Element Leader (PO III+1)
- SWAT Officer (Breacher)
- SWAT Officer (Sniper – at least two)
- SWAT Officer (EMT)
- SWAT Officer (CNT Primary)
- SWAT Officer (CNT Secondary)
- SWAT Officers (Element Members)
- Armory Personnel (SWAT Truck & BEAR drivers)
- Detective assigned to Metro Division
- K-9, Metro Division
- LAFD Tactical Emergency Medical Services (TEMS)
- Behavioral Science Services (BSS) Doctor
- Mental Health Evaluation Unit (MEU)

⁷ According to research conducted by SWAT, the population of Los Angeles increases by approximately one million people during the hours of 1000 to 1900, due to commuters traveling into the City for work. Given this significant rise in population—and the fact that most operations begin and end within this timeframe—the hours of 1000 to 1900 were designated as the Start of Watch (SOW) and End of Watch (EOW).

⁸ The total stand-by package consists of one Lieutenant, three Sergeants, and a total of 18 officers—comprising of one Sergeant and two negotiators assigned to CNT and two Sergeants with 16 officers assigned to tactics.

⁹ 2020 SWAT Guidebook, pp. 16-17.

This comprehensive stand-by team ensures that the Department can respond effectively to a wide range of critical incidents at any time.

DUTIES

SWAT performs a variety of duties, with the most common being barricaded suspects, high-risk warrant service, and CNT – only operations. For this report, the OIG focused primarily on these three categories due to their frequency. However, SWAT is also responsible for a range of additional functions as outlined below:

- Hostage rescue
- Tactical rescues
- Hostage siege
- Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD)
- Multiple Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC)
- Pedestrian interdiction – homicide bomber
- Armed or high-risk suicide people
- High-risk K-9 searches
- Dignitary protection
- Protection details
- Special Events
- Firearms destruction
- Narcotics destruction
- Seizures of excessive quantities of narcotics
- Breaching assist
- Chemical agent assist (with K-9)
- Tech assist (robotics)
- Clearing contaminated environments
- As directed by the Chief of Police

III. OIG REVIEW METHODOLOGY

The OIG used a comprehensive approach to provide both context and detailed insight into SWAT operations.

The OIG observed eight spontaneous SWAT call-outs and one pre-planned high-risk warrant service.¹⁰ These attendances provided a firsthand view of SWAT operations in real-world conditions. OIG personnel were present throughout the full progression of incident, including the initial screening and intake, notification, deployment of resources, execution of the tactical plan, and post-incident debrief. These observations offered valuable insight into the unit's emphasis on communication, safety, tactical decision making, and professional standards.

¹⁰ All nine incidents were observed between January 2, 2025, and July 2, 2025.

To supplement these observations, the OIG also conducted a thorough review of SWAT's After-Action Reports, Screen Down sheets, the SWAT Guidebook, and the Department's 2022 SWAT Ten-Year Review. The OIG compared these materials with standards established by the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and California Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) to assess alignment with national and statewide benchmarks and identify any areas in which LAPD practices may exceed, meet, or fall short of POST guidance.

Because SWAT operates as an integrated component of the LAPD, this review also considers the relationship between SWAT and broader Department operations, while maintaining primary focus on SWAT functions. For example, during SWAT call-outs, local Area officers are typically already on scene managing the incident.

This combination of interviews, direct observation, and document review enabled the OIG to evaluate the effectiveness of SWAT operations and assess SWAT's administrative practices and oversight mechanisms related to operational compliance, preparedness, and accountability.

IV. STANDARDS AND BENCHMARKING ORGANIZATIONS FOR TACTICAL OFFICERS/UNITS

A. LAPD SWAT 2020 GUIDEBOOK

The *SWAT Guidebook 2020* (Guidebook) serves as an operational guide that outlines the policies, procedures, and tactical frameworks for the SWAT team. It defines SWAT's core mission: *"to provide law enforcement with a specialized response to high-risk situations that exceed the capabilities of regular patrol officers."* The Guidebook emphasizes the importance of a well-defined team structure, a clear command and control hierarchy, and strict adherence to tactical protocols—including policies governing the use of deadly force. It also underscores the significance of unified command during deployments, especially when multiple jurisdictions or units are involved.

In relation to SWAT operations, the Guidebook functions as both a reference and an operational doctrine. It enforces consistency in tactical planning, communication flow, and field execution, which is critical during high-stress incidents. By establishing a standardized decision-making process and clearly defined roles—such as the SWAT OIC and Metro Captain in call-out authorizations—the framework directly supports operational workflow and coordination. The Guidebook also outlines the various lethal, less-lethal, and specialized equipment used in support of SWAT operations. The Guidebook is a foundational document for ensuring lawful, effective, and disciplined SWAT deployment.

The Guidebook outlines the criteria and procedures for initiating SWAT call-outs, detailing the roles of the IC, Metro Desk, SWAT OIC, and other elements within the chain of command. It emphasizes the decision to activate SWAT resources must be based on clearly defined threat criteria and require multiple layers of approval from both field and command personnel.

SWAT personnel utilize a Screen Down sheet to document their assessment as to whether an incident meets established criteria for SWAT deployment (*see* Appendix A). The Screen Down sheet plays a critical role in the initial assessment process as it helps ensure that each deployment is justified, proportionate, and strategically coordinated—minimizing risks to officers, suspects, and the public.

B. SWAT TEN-YEAR REVIEW

The LAPD’s “SWAT Ten-Year Review” (review) is a comprehensive report prepared by the LAPD’s Constitutional Policing and Policy Bureau and presented to the Board of Police Commissioners in July 2022.¹¹ The review examined SWAT operations over a ten-year period (2012–2022) with a particular focus on use of force trends, deployment patterns, and tactical outcomes.

The review analyzed SWAT’s performance, assessed the frequency and nature of deadly force incidents, and evaluated how effectively SWAT resolved high-risk operations while minimizing harm. The review included statistical data, case examples, and comparative analyses to identify trends, highlight best practices, and support transparency and accountability in the Department’s most specialized tactical unit.

Over a ten-year span from 2012 through 2022, LAPD SWAT deployed over 1,350 times for spontaneous incidents and approximately 250 warrants, yet the use of deadly force occurred in only 17 instances, representing just over 1% of all deployments.¹² This remarkably low percentage highlighted SWAT’s ongoing commitment to resolving critical incidents through measured, strategic responses. The data demonstrated that in most operations—whether involving armed suspects, barricades, or high-risk warrants—SWAT successfully employed tactics that minimized harm to officers, suspects, and the public.

Additionally, in 92% of all incidents, SWAT resolved the situation without using force of any kind. Even in high-risk, volatile scenarios, the use of lethal force remained the exception rather than the norm. This consistent pattern underscores SWAT’s emphasis on de-escalation, negotiation, and tactical restraint. The review attributed this success not only to specialized training and equipment but also to a culture of disciplined decision making and oversight that reinforced the use of force only when absolutely necessary.

C. NATIONAL TACTICAL OFFICER ASSOCIATION AND STATE STANDARDS

Two primary organizations play a central role in guiding tactical law enforcement practices in California: National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). These entities help define essential training benchmarks, set professional standards, and support the ongoing development of tactical units like LAPD SWAT by outlining both foundational skills and emerging best practices.

¹¹ https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/072622/BPC_22-156.pdf

¹² No deadly force was used on warrant service during that data extraction period.

National Tactical Officers Association

NTOA is a professional organization dedicated to advancing the standards and effectiveness of tactical law enforcement operations. According to the 2023 *NTOA Tactical Response and Operations Standard (TROS)* document, NTOA's primary mission is to enhance the performance and professionalism of law enforcement personnel through training, education, and acts as a forum for the development of tactics and information exchange.¹³ The organization serves as a central resource for agencies developing or maintaining SWAT and tactical teams and offers guidance, subject-matter expertise, and comprehensive benchmarks for training, staffing, mission readiness, and operational conduct.

NTOA hosts an annual multi-day conference to provide updates on current tactical operations and training. The conference offers attendees valuable insight into best practices from across the country. LAPD SWAT routinely sends personnel to attend—and occasionally instruct at—this event. Participation in the NTOA conference enables LAPD SWAT to remain current with evolving tactics and incorporate nationally recognized best practices into its own operations.

NTOA sets detailed expectations through a tiered classification system (TIER 1 through TIER 4) that outlines minimum standards for personnel, mission capabilities, and training. TIER 1 and TIER 2 teams are considered fully capable SWAT teams, trained for a broad range of high-risk missions including hostage rescues, barricaded subjects, and counterterrorism. TIER 3 (Tactical Response Teams) and TIER 4 (Perimeter Control Teams) have more limited capabilities and often require MOUs with higher-tier teams for certain operations. NTOA emphasizes risk mitigation, adherence to constitutional principles, and the need for consistent, scenario-based training.

According to NTOA standards, LAPD SWAT qualifies as a TIER 1 SWAT team based on the following established criteria:

- A single agency team, multi-jurisdictional team, regional team, or through an MOA.
- Mission profile: Hostage Rescue Operations, Barricaded Subject Operations, High-Risk Warrant Service and Apprehension Operations, Terrorism Response Operations, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Dignitary Protection Operations, Man Tracking Operations (Rural and Woodland), Active Assailant (Shooter/Killer), Public Order Operations Support.

NTOA recommends the following minimum staffing for certain TIER 1 SWAT team duties:

- Minimum personnel: 34
- Team Commander: 1
- Team Leader: 4
- Snipers: 8

¹³ The 2023 NTOA Tactical Response and Operations Standard (TROS) document serves as a high-level manual that offers recommendations and guidance on how tactical teams should operate and key considerations for effective performance.

- Entry Operators: 18
- TEMS: 3

The OIG reviewed the current LAPD roster, which reflects the following number of personnel assigned to LAPD SWAT under the respective NTOA classification categories:

- Personnel: 54 (6 open slots)
- Team Commander: 2
- Team Leader: 6
- Snipers: 13
- Entry Operators: 54 (6 open slots)
- TEMS: 8 (Provided by LAFD)
- EMT: 7 (SWAT Officers)

Based on NTOA criteria, LAPD SWAT exceeds the minimum structural requirements for a TIER 1 team. Notably, all LAPD SWAT officers assigned to specialty cadres are also cross-trained and actively participate in Entry Operations. While NTOA offers recommendations—rather than formal mandates—on administrative practices and standard operating guidelines, LAPD SWAT addresses nearly all of the approximately 40 Standard Operating Guideline categories outlined by NTOA. Although the terminology used by LAPD may differ slightly from that of NTOA, the underlying functions remain aligned. Additionally, LAPD SWAT maintains the recommended equipment and resources identified in NTOA's TROS document for TIER 1 teams.

California Peace Officer Standards and Training

California POST serves as the primary standard-setting authority for law enforcement training and certification in California. It establishes minimum selection, training, and professional development requirements for peace officers, dispatchers, and law enforcement agencies statewide.

The POST SWAT Manual (2019) serves as a comprehensive guideline for the organization, training, operations, and administration of SWAT teams in California. Its primary purpose is to establish standardized components and minimum best practices for law enforcement agencies that operate or plan to develop a SWAT capability.

This document recommends SWAT teams employ qualifications, training requirements, deployment protocols, operational planning, and supervisory expectations for SWAT personnel. It is intended to ensure that SWAT operations are conducted safely, effectively, and consistently across jurisdictions, while maintaining accountability and legal compliance. The manual supports agency leadership in building or evaluating their tactical programs and reinforces the importance of readiness, coordination, and adherence to constitutional standards during high-risk incidents.

The POST SWAT Manual is less detailed than the NTOA TROS Guidebook and does not offer specific recommendations regarding SWAT team tiers, specialized cadres, personnel roles, or

organizational categories. Instead, the POST SWAT Manual is more conceptual in nature, providing general guidance and considerations for agencies when forming and maintaining a SWAT team.

LAPD SWAT is fully compliant with all California POST recommendations for SWAT teams. However, these guidelines are less detailed and objective than those provided by NTOA. While California POST does not establish specific metrics for SWAT operations, it encourages consideration of key areas such as regularly scheduled training, operational planning, and command and control structures. LAPD SWAT meets these expectations across all key areas, including training, planning, leadership, and more.

V. INTAKE AND SCREENING PROCESS FOR SWAT RESOURCES

LAPD SWAT is housed within the Metro Division, where the communication hub—referred to as the “Metro Desk”—is staffed by two full-time officers, one assigned to the day shift and the other to the night shift. To support continuous 24-hour coverage, personnel from other Metro platoons rotate in to assist the full-time desk officers.¹⁴ This staffing model ensures that two officers are consistently present at the Metro Desk to manage communications and coordinate operations.

When an incident arises in the field that may warrant SWAT involvement, a responding at-scene officer—typically a field supervisor—contacts the Metro Desk to initiate the intake and screening process. All requests for SWAT assistance—regardless of whether they result in a deployment—are documented in the watch commander’s daily log and reviewed by the Metro Captain for oversight purposes. To streamline communications and reduce confusion, the Department employs a single, centralized phone number for all SWAT-related requests.

Upon receiving the call, Metro Desk officers gather essential details, including the nature of the incident, suspect and victim information, presence of weapons, and location specifics. This information is relayed to the on-call SWAT OIC either in person or by phone. The SWAT OIC completes a hard copy Screen Down sheet to document whether the incident meets established criteria for SWAT deployment. To confirm critical information and reduce the risk of miscommunication during high-stress events, the SWAT OIC communicates directly with the IC at scene.

If the incident does not meet the threshold for deployment, the SWAT OIC will continue to provide tactical input through a process known as “Advice and Guidance.” In these cases, the SWAT OIC offers strategic recommendations to the IC without initiating a full deployment. These consultations are documented on the Screen Down sheet, and the OIC informs the Metro Desk of the determination.

¹⁴ Metro Division functions as a specialized support division, rather than a traditional Area responsible for routine community patrols. It encompasses several distinct units, including SWAT, K-9, Mounted (Equestrian), and crime suppression teams. These units are organized into platoons: A Platoon (administrative functions), B & C Platoons (crime suppression), D Platoon (SWAT), and E Platoon (equestrian operations).

Completed Screen Down sheets are maintained in hard copy by the SWAT OIC in a locked cabinet and serve as a record of the on-call SWAT OIC's decision to deploy or not deploy SWAT resources. These documents are reviewed at the request of management to clarify SWAT's involvement in specific incidents. In 2024, SWAT completed 320 Screen Down sheets of which 196 were categorized as Advice and Guidance while 124 resulted in SWAT deployments.

In addition to incident screening, the Metro Desk receives approximately 1,500 warrant screening requests annually, all of which are forwarded to SWAT supervisors for review. Department policy requires all search and arrest warrants to be reviewed by a SWAT supervisor to determine whether the circumstances meet the criteria for SWAT involvement.¹⁵ If further scrutiny is needed, a SWAT OIC or Assistant OIC provides additional guidance.

In 2024, SWAT participated in 14 high-risk warrants. When a warrant does not meet deployment criteria, SWAT frequently offers tactical recommendations. In 2024, SWAT provided advisory input (non-binding recommendations) for 1,475 search and arrest warrants. SWAT may also be called upon for supplementary roles such as technical support, chemical agent assist (with K-9), or breacher assistance.

VI. ACTIVATION AND CALL-OUT PROTOCOLS

A. SWAT ACTIVATION CRITERIA

The decision to deploy SWAT is based on specific operational thresholds. While each incident is unique, deployment of a SWAT team is generally considered when all the following four conditions are present:

1. The suspect is believed to be armed or has access to weapons;
2. There is probable cause to believe the suspect is involved in a criminal act or poses a threat to public or officer safety;
3. The suspect occupies a position of tactical advantage (e.g., concealed or covered) or is in an open area where police presence may escalate the risk; and,
4. The suspect refuses to comply with a lawful arrest.

B. CRISIS NEGOTIATION TEAM (CNT) – ONLY DEPLOYMENT

In certain scenarios, a CNT-only response may be initiated. This typically occurs when:

- An armed individual is threatening suicide; or
- A suicidal person is located on an elevated or otherwise hazardous platform, presenting a safety risk to first responders, and,
- No crime or low-level crime.

¹⁵ LAPD Manual, Quarter 3 – 2025, Volume 4, Section 742.05, *Search and Arrest Warrant Service Policy and Procedures – Screen-Down Process*.

C. NO CALL-OUT PROCEDURES

When an incident does not meet deployment criteria, the SWAT OIC provides Advice and Guidance, as detailed above.

D. CALL-OUT PROCEDURES

If a situation meets the criteria for SWAT deployment, the SWAT OIC instructs the at-scene IC to obtain authorization from their Division/Area captain.¹⁶ Once that approval is secured, the SWAT OIC notifies the Metro Captain for final concurrence, adding an additional layer of oversight and accountability.


Following authorization, the SWAT OIC consults with the on-call SWAT Supervisor and Element Leader to review the incident, evaluate strategic options, and determine the appropriate allocation of resources. Once a deployment plan is confirmed, the SWAT OIC calls the Metro Desk to craft the alert to ensure completeness and accuracy. Then Metro Desk issues an activation alert via email to all on-call SWAT personnel. The notification is sent to Department-issued cell phones and copied to the Department's Counter Terrorism Special Operations Bureau Commanding Officer, Assistant Commanding Officer, and both Metro Captains.

On-call officers are required to respond, while off-call personnel acknowledge receipt but do not deploy unless instructed. In urgent or high-risk incidents—such as hostage rescues requiring full-team activation—the subject line of the alert will read “ALL-HANDS” to signal a comprehensive and immediate response from both on-call and available off-call SWAT personnel.

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¹⁶ Although not formally required by Department policy, SWAT and Metro Division consider obtaining authorization from the requesting-Division/Area captain to be a best practice that promotes oversight and accountability.

Figure 2: Assessment Process to Determine SWAT Deployment



VII. SWAT OPERATIONS

SWAT is typically deployed for three types of unplanned critical incidents: barricade situations, hostage rescues, and active shooter events.¹⁷ Among these, barricade incidents are the most frequent, with hostage rescue being the most critical. SWAT undertakes significant active shooter training to be prepared for any future active shooter situation. During the time of this review, SWAT did not deploy for any active shooter events.

A. BARRICADE SITUATIONS

A barricade situation typically involves a suspect who has committed a violent crime, often involving a deadly weapon such as a firearm or edged weapon, and then refuses to submit to arrest. These suspects barricade themselves in locations where forced entry would pose significant risk to officers. When the suspect is in a fortified position of advantage and refuses to surrender, thereby creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death, a request for SWAT resources is initiated.

The OIG accompanied SWAT on eight spontaneous barricade incidents to examine the methodology and decision-making process underlying SWAT deployments. The OIG observed the full scope of the process and action of a call-out.

Summary of Barricade Incident Observed on April 22, 2025, in Southeast Area

On April 22, 2025, OIG staff were meeting with the SWAT OIC at Metro when, at 1500 hours, Southeast Area contacted the Metro Desk regarding a potential SWAT call-out. OIG staff observed the Metro Desk officer obtain the initial details from the IC, then walk to the SWAT OIC and present him with the preliminary details. The SWAT OIC then completed a Screen Down sheet to formalize the assessment of the situation and determine whether the incident met the criteria for SWAT deployment.

Note: Any officer who encounters a situation involving an armed, barricaded suspect—who has committed a crime and refuses to surrender—may contact the Metro Desk to determine if SWAT resources are needed.

Following the intake, the SWAT OIC directly contacted the Southeast Area at-scene IC to obtain additional details and clarify any outstanding information needed for the assessment. The SWAT OIC learned that the female suspect reportedly exited her apartment armed with two knives and threatened to stab several maintenance workers due to noise related to their work. Southeast Area responding officers attempted to negotiate with the suspect to surrender; however, she barricaded herself inside the apartment using various household items.

¹⁷ Active shooter responses have evolved significantly over the past decades, and there is no longer an expectation that SWAT will serve as the primary response, as mobilizing a SWAT team typically takes too long. Instead, active shooter mitigation tactics are now taught to patrol officers and detectives, enabling them to respond swiftly to immediate threats. However, because active shooter incidents have the potential to escalate into hostage situations, SWAT is still often requested to deploy in these scenarios.

Given that the suspect was armed with a deadly weapon, barricaded herself, refused to surrender, and committed a crime – the situation met LAPD’s criteria for SWAT activation. However, the SWAT OIC informed the IC that before SWAT resources could be deployed, SWAT required authorization from the Southeast Area Captain. The IC subsequently obtained verbal approval – via a cell phone call – from the Southeast Area Captain to activate SWAT. Once the Captain provided approval, the SWAT OIC informed the Metro Captain of the situation and obtained his approval to deploy SWAT resources.

After receiving authorization, the SWAT OIC conducted an in-person meeting with the SWAT Supervisor and Element Leader to relay the incident details. The Metro Desk officer issued an activation notification for on-duty SWAT officers to respond to the incident. At this point, SWAT personnel received an email to their smart phones for a SWAT call-out and were directed to deploy to the CP location in Southeast Area.

SWAT Element members drove to the CP in their Department-issued vehicles with emergency lights and sirens activated. During the time SWAT personnel were enroute, Southeast Area officers established a perimeter and continued to work on the problem, seeking a resolution until SWAT took over the scene.

Note: The initiation of a SWAT response does not preclude continued engagement by the initial responding officers. In many instances, the initial responding officers have successfully resolved the incident problem prior to the arrival of SWAT resources.

The CP location was selected to be close enough to the incident site for effective coordination, yet far enough to ensure the safety of personnel focused on administrative and logistical functions. Furthermore, since non-law enforcement personnel – such as Fire, TEMS, MEU personnel, and a BSS psychologist – were present at the CP, a location that provided some level of safety was necessary. OIG staff observed a log being maintained, which documented all personnel within the perimeter, including their name, assignment, and serial number. This ensured accurate accountability of all individuals who participated in the operation.

The SWAT OIC utilized a dry-erase board to organize key operational information. The board included categories such as the IC hierarchy, general incident details, suspect information, resources requested, incident classification, designated radio frequency, CP location, and critical contact numbers. The use of the dry-erase board enabled all personnel assigned to the CP to maintain situational awareness, particularly as officers frequently rotate in and out of the area.

Southeast Area police units blocked off intersections to establish a perimeter and used yellow police tape to cordon off the area. Southeast Area officers secured the perimeter, restricting access and maintaining the integrity of the incident scene.

Note: Residents located within a perimeter are either evacuated or allowed to remain on their premises, depending on the assessed level of danger associated with the incident.

OIG staff observed that upon arrival, SWAT officers quickly assembled and donned their ballistic vests, helmets, rifles, and other essential equipment. Element Leaders, in coordination with SWAT supervisors, developed a tactical plan and directed Element Members to their assigned positions at the incident site. Their Body-Worn Video (BWV) cameras¹⁸—mounted on their tactical vests—were immediately activated and began recording. In this incident, Southeast Area officers had already established containment, and SWAT officers systematically relieved them to assume control of the perimeter.

A South Bureau Commander was present at the scene and assumed the role of IC. Also present were the Metro Captain and Southeast Area Captain.

Note: During a SWAT call-out, typically, the Bureau Commander or designee will deploy to the CP and assume IC responsibilities.

During this deployment, as with all SWAT deployments, there are several key layers of supervision and oversight. The Element Leader formulated the tactical strategy for the incident and managed the Element Members. Overseeing the Element Leader were two SWAT Supervisors assuming tactical leadership roles. Furthermore, a CNT SWAT Supervisor was also involved. The SWAT OIC then managed all three SWAT supervisors. This model allowed for significant tactical oversight and supervision within the SWAT team. However, the SWAT OIC is not the final decision maker, the IC is, who in this scenario was a Bureau Commander. Augmenting the oversight responsibilities were two Captains – one from Metro and another from Southeast Area. The OIG observed that this integrated Area/SWAT leadership model provided maximum command and control over the SWAT deployment.

Using a public address system from the rear of a Bearcat armored vehicle, CNT initiated communication with the suspect. The suspect was located on the second-floor apartment of a two-story apartment complex containing approximately ten residential units.

Note: Typically, CNT is comprised of a primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, detective, and BSS psychologist. The primary negotiator is the individual who communicates directly with the suspect.

OIG staff observed the primary negotiator attempt to de-escalate and communicate with the suspect the Department's desire to resolve the situation without violence. While this dialogue occurred, the secondary negotiator took detailed notes and offered suggestions to the primary negotiator. The secondary negotiator obtained valuable intelligence on the suspect and other

¹⁸ See Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau Notice, *Deployment and Use of the Body Worn Video for Metropolitan Division*, dated June 13, 2018 – The Department's Body-Worn Video (BWV) policy for SWAT differs slightly from that of other Department personnel. While officers responding Code 3—using emergency lights and sirens activated—must activate their BWV cameras while enroute, they typically already wear these devices on their standard uniforms. In contrast, SWAT officers are often in training, or after hours, when call-outs occur and do not wear standard uniforms. Upon arrival at the incident site, SWAT personnel don their ballistic vests—onto which their BWV cameras are mounted—and participate in a tactical briefing. Once enroute to the actual incident site, SWAT officers then activate their BWV cameras.

background information from at-scene personnel. This intelligence was relayed to the primary negotiator, who continued interacting with the suspect. Furthermore, an extra level of experience was also part of CNT, and that was the incorporation of the BSS psychologist. After several minutes of negotiation and Garner warnings, the suspect exited the apartment voluntarily and surrendered and was safely taken into custody without the use of force or injury.¹⁹

Note: BSS psychologists are Department employees who provide psychological services to the organization. In addition, they are integrated into CNT and support negotiators during critical incidents by providing expertise in human behavior. BSS provides valuable insight into human behavior and can offer guidance on how to best interact with a suspect. After all de-escalation efforts have been exhausted and CNT declares an impasse, SWAT may then proceed with tactical options to resolve the situation.

Following the resolution of the incident, the SWAT OIC conducted a debrief “walk-through” with the Element Leader to gain a detailed understanding of the events, since the OIC remained at the CP during the operation. The Element Leader provided an account of the incident from a tactical perspective.

Subsequently, a full SWAT debrief was held at the scene with all Department personnel involved, including tactical officers and support Area officers. During the debrief, lessons learned, observations, and operational insights and decisions were discussed with the objective of improving future response effectiveness. OIG staff observed that the debrief environment remained constructive and professional, without the use of harsh language or personal criticism. Command staff, including the IC, also participated, offering their observations, appreciation, and support to the team.

Summary of Barricade Incident Observed on June 13, 2025, in 77th Street Area

SWAT responded to a request from 77th Street Area of a male suspect who shot his neighbor with a handgun and subsequently barricaded himself inside his residence.²⁰ A CP was previously established by the 77th Street Area officers attempting to negotiate with the suspect to surrender.

OIG staff responded to the CP at which time the SWAT OIC provided a briefing to command staff. The SWAT OIC explained that the property contained two separate residences: a front unit and a detached rear unit. The suspect occupied and barricaded himself in the rear unit.

¹⁹ *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) and *Deorle v. Rutherford* (2001) are foundational cases guiding police use of force under the Fourth Amendment, with direct implications for LAPD policy. *Garner* held that deadly force may only be used against a fleeing suspect if they pose an imminent threat of serious harm, emphasizing necessity and proportionality. *Deorle* extended this principle to less-lethal force, ruling that officers must issue a verbal warning, when feasible, before deploying such force—particularly when the suspect is unarmed or not actively threatening. In the context of the LAPD, these rulings underscore the constitutional requirement that officers provide clear warnings prior to using less-lethal options like beanbag rounds or 40mm launchers, reinforcing the Department’s commitment to de-escalation and measured response.

²⁰ OIG staff were notified of the SWAT call-out at the time the activation email was sent to all on-call SWAT personnel.

The Bureau Commander—who had assumed the role of IC—was present at the scene, along with a 77th Street Area Captain, a Lieutenant, and the Metro Captain. Personnel from LAFD and TEMS unit were also on site, and an LAPD airship provided aerial support. OIG staff observed that SWAT evacuated nearby apartments and houses to reduce the risk of injury to bystanders should the use of force become necessary.

The perimeter was secured on all sides, extending several houses from the suspect's location, using patrol vehicles, officers, and police tape. However, the eastern perimeter lacked active monitoring, allowing two civilians to breach the perimeter and attempt to install a tripod camera to record the incident. Officers intervened and ordered the individuals to leave; however, no officers were assigned to secure the breached area, despite the presence of several unassigned officers nearby.

Note: OIG staff observed additional instances across various SWAT operations in different locations where Area officers failed to secure the perimeter, despite the availability of adequate resources.

The SWAT OIC displayed a large whiteboard with critical operational details such as target location, contact numbers, the IC, CNT Supervisor, and other relevant information. A digital tablet displayed a Google Maps overview of the area.

SWAT communications were managed through the designated radio channel, which provided real-time updates to the CP. Tactical developments were continuously relayed, and while discussions occurred between element members, supervisors, and the SWAT OIC, all tactical decisions were presented to the Bureau Commander for final authorization.

SWAT officers positioned themselves in a back room of the front residence, facing the rear unit, and utilized a large ballistic shield for cover. As Bearcat armored vehicles were positioned and CNT attempted negotiations, the suspect responded with violent threats directed at SWAT officers. The suspect fired three rounds at the SWAT officers.

Despite being under fire, SWAT officers maintained tactical discipline and did not return fire, relying instead on effective cover. Rather than return gunfire, SWAT deployed six small canisters of chemical agents into the suspect's residence, after which the suspect surrendered without further incident. SWAT consistently sought to resolve incidents without resorting to deadly force—even when its use may be legally justified—if viable intermediate force options are available. The suspect was taken into custody by SWAT and handed over to 77th Street Area officers to process his arrest.

Overall OIG Observations and Comments: A key capability absent at each CP was the use of technology – specifically, a laptop or tablet with a monitor that would allow the IC and SWAT OIC to view real-time information and video of the incident area. Live-feed cameras mounted

on armored vehicles, exterior drone footage, and geographic information-sharing software such as ATAK on smartphones could provide enhanced situational awareness to support informed command and control decisions.

Providing required documents²¹ at the CP through SharePoint on smartphones or tablets would also streamline documentation and reduce administrative burden. Unlike hard copies that must be printed and later uploaded, electronic documents can be accessed instantly from any location at any time.

OIG staff observed that approximately 40 personnel – including SWAT, Metro, and Area personnel – deployed to resolve the incidents.

B. HOSTAGE RESCUE

Hostage situations are among the most complex and high-risk tactical incidents law enforcement officers face. Although rare, these events demand specialized training, and a significant portion of SWAT's preparation is dedicated to hostage rescue. During the OIG's review period, no hostage incidents occurred. To assess LAPD SWAT's readiness, the OIG examined a 2021 hostage incident. The OIG selected this incident because of its severity, significant media coverage, successful resolution, and the range of SWAT's operational capabilities it demonstrated. A summary of the incident and the OIG's observations is provided below.

Summary of Hostage Incident on October 8, 2021, in Central Area

On October 8, 2021, a suspect with a violent criminal history committed a series of firearm-related crimes in downtown Los Angeles. After evading arrest, the suspect entered an apartment building in downtown Los Angeles and forcibly took a woman into her apartment unit. Cellphone recorded footage confirmed that the suspect was holding the victim at gunpoint and, at times, placing the firearm against the victim's head.²² LAPD SWAT deployed at approximately 1730 hours.

Although the operation began with the CNT, visual confirmation of the suspect threatening the victim's life prompted a rapid shift to a hostage rescue. With the IC's approval, SWAT initiated an explosive breach at 1844 hours. Officers entered the apartment seconds later, resulting in an officer-involved shooting and the safe rescue of the victim. Medical aid was rendered immediately; however, the armed suspect was fatally wounded.

This case highlights SWAT's capability to transition swiftly from negotiation to rescue under life-threatening conditions.

²¹ AAR, Personnel Log Sheet, Warrant Responsibility Forms, and other various documents.

²² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FD7SIfwvQs>.

C. HIGH-RISK WARRANT

To obtain SWAT support for high-risk warrants, several factors are considered, including:

- The potential use of high-powered, armor-piercing weapons—typically rifles
- Terrain or structural fortification challenges
- History of criminal aggression toward law enforcement (e.g., assaults on officers)

Additionally, the totality of the circumstances is weighed. Not all criteria must be met for a SWAT deployment to be approved. Rather, a reasonable belief, based on available facts, can justify a SWAT response. SWAT leadership ultimately determines whether a warrant qualifies as high-risk. If a warrant is deemed medium-risk and the requesting Division/Area lacks the proper training or tools, warrant service may be delegated to Metro's B and C Platoons, which specialize in crime suppression and conduct more consistent tactical training than Area officers.

Crucially, the nature and gravity of the crime guides whether a SWAT deployment is warranted. If Area warrant operations do not meet SWAT criteria, SWAT may instead provide Advice and Guidance to assist. These recommendations are not binding. SWAT also advises Area detectives that if the warrant service turns into a barricade situation, SWAT will respond and assume tactical control.

Although the timing of the warrant service is ultimately determined by Area detectives, SWAT maintains the capability to respond rapidly, including on short notice if needed. The SWAT OIC requires the Area detectives to provide a copy of the warrant and the affidavit. This ensures that the SWAT OIC has a clear understanding of the criminal circumstances and can evaluate whether reasonable to justify SWAT involvement. This also aids in conducting a proper risk-management assessment when allocating SWAT resources.

Summary of High-risk Arrest Warrant Operation Observed on August 19, 2025, in Southeast Area

Southeast Area detectives were investigating an incident involving four gang members who had been tagging.²³ A rival gang member confronted them, leading to a shootout during which an innocent bystander—a postal worker—was struck by stray gunfire. During the investigation, Southeast Area detectives identified four gang members, two of whom had prior convictions for assault weapon charges against law enforcement. Southeast Area Detectives obtained a search and arrest warrant for the four suspects and submitted the warrants to SWAT approximately one week prior to the service date.

Planning and Approval Process

Once SWAT decided to serve the warrant, coordination began between SWAT Element Leaders and Southeast Area detectives. Element Leaders developed a tactical plan for the warrant service

²³ Tagging refers to the deliberate use of graffiti by gang members to mark surfaces in public or private spaces—such as walls, fences, alleys, and buildings—with symbols, acronyms, numbers, or monikers associated with a specific gang. This act serves as a visible expression of gang presence, territorial control, intimidation, and communication within the gang subculture.

and formalized it into an Operations Plan, prepared in PowerPoint format. This plan was first reviewed and approved by the SWAT OIC and then submitted to the Metro Captain for final authorization. If any issues or concerns arose, the SWAT OIC and Metro Captain resolved them through in-person discussions.

Day of Operation

At 0630 hours, Supervisors, Element Leaders, and Element Members gathered at Metro Division to prepare for the operation. They reviewed Google Maps imagery and photographs of the target location—revealed to be a hotel room. The suspects, also currently involved in armed robberies of both individuals and businesses, were known to frequently change locations to evade detection. However, Southeast Area detectives used advanced investigative techniques to pinpoint the suspects' location.

At 0700 hours, OIG staff observed the official SWAT warrant briefing which occurred in a Metro Division classroom involving approximately 40 SWAT officers. The Operations Plan was presented via PowerPoint, and hard copies were distributed. A Warrant Assignment Sheet was distributed, detailing each officer's assignment, equipment needs, and vehicle deployment. The briefing included:

- Background of the investigation
- Suspect details
- Photos of the target location with directional and tactical annotations
- Emergency chemical agent plan
- Medical contingency briefing and trauma center route
- Department Use of Force policies

During the briefing, SWAT was informed that surveillance units had already arrested one suspect as he exited the residence. This eliminated the need to target the second location.

Tactical Deployment

After the briefing, OIG staff traveled with the SWAT OIC to the target location. Approximately five minutes prior to arrival, the Element Leader radioed all members to activate their BWV cameras. The SWAT OIC established a CP outside the line of sight of the target to ensure safety, as non-law enforcement personnel were also present. Upon arrival at the CP, a second tactical briefing was conducted to ensure all personnel were present and fully aware of their assignments. While at the CP, the SWAT OIC took detailed, time-stamped notes documenting all significant events. These notes would be later used to support the OIC's recollections during interviews, especially in the event of a use of force. The Metro Captain was present at the CP, but the Southeast Area Captain was absent from both the warrant briefing at Metro Division and the CP.

Note: According to best practices under the Incident Command System (ICS),²⁴ it is advisable for the requesting-Area Captain—or an officer of equivalent or higher rank—to be present during the operation. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized, hierarchical framework used by law enforcement and other emergency response agencies to manage critical incidents such as natural disasters, large-scale events, and tactical law enforcement operations—including active shooter situations, barricades, and hostage rescues. Having the Area Captain present during SWAT operations ensures parity with the Metro Captain and maintains operational accountability, given that the Area initiated the request for SWAT support.

SWAT deployed two armored Bearcat vehicles, several less-lethal tools, and a mobile barricade for cover. SWAT CNT officers called out to the suspect using a bullhorn. The suspect complied and exited the residence without incident and was turned over to Southeast detectives. A firearm was recovered from the location during the warrant search.

Debrief and Documentation

Following the operation, all SWAT personnel returned to Metro for a debriefing led by the Element Leader and Supervisor. OIG staff observed that the debrief encouraged feedback from all officers in a professional and constructive manner. A Post-Warrant Assignment Sheet was circulated to document each officer's specific role and location during the operation. This log promotes accountability and serves as a permanent record.

Overall OIG Comments: Although all warrant documents are stored in hard-copy files, the Department recently developed an online AAR system specific for warrant service that mirrors the format used for barricade incidents. Supervisors are required to complete these AARs online. The current platform, however, cannot upload key documents such as the Operations Plan, Warrant Assignment Sheet, and Post-Warrant Assignment Sheet, requiring continued reliance on physical folders for supplemental documentation.

D. CRISIS NEGOTIATION TEAM (CNT)-ONLY

SWAT CNT-only package deployment configuration is primarily utilized for suicide-related incidents, including those occurring on elevated platforms. This configuration is generally limited to two negotiators (primary and secondary), a BSS psychologist, a sergeant, and a lieutenant. In these deployments, CNT personnel manage negotiations and provide tactical guidance, while uniformed patrol officers carry out tactical actions under CNT advisement. During the period of this review, the OIG was unable to directly observe a live CNT-only

²⁴ While there is no explicit industry standard requiring that the IC hold the rank of Captain or higher in a law enforcement context, foundational ICS guidelines strongly suggest that the IC role demands a high level of authority. In practice, the IC is typically a senior-ranking officer—often a Captain or above—who possesses clear agency authority to make operational decisions, coordinate resources, and ensure the safety of personnel and the public.
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/ics%20organizational%20structure%20and%20elements.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

operation. The OIG instead reviewed relevant BWV, AAR, and conducted interviews with CNT personnel. A summary of the incident and the OIG's observations is provided below.

Summary of CNT-Only Incident on October 15, 2025, in North Hollywood Area

At 0548 hours on October 15, 2025, North Hollywood Area patrol units responded to multiple radio calls regarding a male armed with a knife and threatening suicide inside a multi-unit apartment complex. Initial information indicated that both a male and a female were present within the apartment and had locked themselves in separate rooms.

Upon arrival, North Hollywood Area officers knocked and announced their presence but received no response. Due to the nature of the call and the potential for imminent loss of life, officers conducted a forced entry. Once inside, they initiated a protective sweep of the apartment to locate both occupants and assess any immediate threats. As officers ascended the stairs, an individual exited a bedroom holding a cell phone. When asked if he had called for help, the individual raised his hand, confirming that he was the reporting party. Officers observed blood on the floor and determined that the upstairs area was clear; however, the first floor remained unsecured.

Officers repeatedly announced their presence and requested that anyone inside the apartment exit their rooms. Through continued communication, officers identified the second occupant—the male subject—and learned that he had locked himself inside the bathroom. Officers attempted to engage him verbally, advising that paramedics were on scene and prepared to provide medical aid, and further reassured him that he was not in trouble and would not be arrested. Despite multiple assurances, the subject did not comply.

After several attempts at verbal engagement, the subject briefly opened the bathroom door, revealing visible puncture wounds on his body. No weapon was observed at that time. The door was then closed, and the subject refused to communicate further. Officers rotated several personnel in hopes of establishing contact, but the subject remained uncooperative.

Given the deteriorating situation and visible signs of blood loss, at-scene officers requested the assistance of a CNT-only package. Upon arrival, CNT personnel were informed that the subject had been cutting himself. The primary negotiator established contact through the closed bathroom door and maintained intermittent dialogue with the subject throughout the incident. During this time, the secondary negotiator gathered background information and coordinated with the subject's mother and boyfriend, who recorded brief audio messages expressing concern and urging the occupant to accept help. These messages were played to the subject to strengthen rapport and encourage voluntary compliance.

After roughly two hours of negotiations, the occupant briefly opened the bathroom door at which time the primary negotiator observed the subject with multiple puncture wounds, significant blood loss, and pallor consistent with shock. Blood was visible on the walls and floor, and the subject appeared disoriented, drifting in and out of consciousness. Based on these observations, the negotiator determined that the subject's condition was critical, and that continued negotiation

would likely result in further medical decline or death. Despite indications that the subject may still have possessed a knife, the negotiator concluded that immediate intervention was necessary to render life-saving aid.

The negotiators and CNT sergeant briefed the IC, recommending that officers conduct a forced entry to rescue the subject. The IC approved the plan, and CNT provided tactical guidance to patrol officers on the entry approach. Patrol officers breached the bathroom door and found the subject semi-conscious and bleeding heavily. TEMS was immediately summoned, rendered on-scene medical aid, and transported the subject to a nearby hospital, where he survived.

In total, CNT maintained communication efforts for approximately two and a half hours before the breach was initiated. The coordinated actions among CNT, patrol officers, and TEMS personnel resulted in the successful rescue and medical stabilization of the subject.

Overall OIG Comments: The OIG's review found that CNT and North Hollywood Area officers demonstrated compliance with Department policies governing crisis intervention, CNT-only deployments, and life-safety decision making. Negotiators effectively employed active communication techniques, leveraged third-party intermediaries, and utilized BSS to attempt a peaceful resolution. The decision to transition from negotiation to tactical intervention was appropriate and justified, based on the subject's observed medical distress and the imminent threat to life.

VIII. DOCUMENTATION – AFTER ACTION REPORT

After every incident in which SWAT is deployed, SWAT personnel generate an AAR. The AAR is designed to be a comprehensive and structured document, capturing critical operational data across nine main categories. Each category includes multiple fields to be completed, though not all sections are applicable to every incident. The form is intentionally robust to allow for detailed documentation where information exists.

Below is a description of the nine main categories of the AAR and examples of the types of information captured:

Incident Overview: Includes attributes such as date and time, incident number, SWAT incident number, crime type, SWAT deployment factors, address, Area, and other basic identifiers.

Response: Captures whether K9 responded to assist SWAT, tactics deployed, entries made, whether the response was CNT-only, whether CNT negotiated, and whether any SWAT personnel used force.

Disposition: Contains checkboxes to document suspect outcomes (e.g., detained, deceased, disengaged), how the incident was resolved (e.g., tactics, CNT, K9, high-risk, IARD, or prior to deployment), as well as the names of the SWAT OIC, date submitted, assigned reviewers, and the individual who submitted the report. It also tracks who made any edits to the document.

Narrative: Provides an open-ended text field where personnel may describe the event in detail, including background context and SWAT's tactical response. This section is not constrained by dropdowns or checkboxes, allowing for free-form documentation.

Location Information: Includes location type, contact phone numbers, and an additional narrative section.

Involved Person(s) Information: Includes suspect details such as name, date of birth, gender, race, height, weight, gang affiliation, moniker, and criminal history. Approximately 34 different data fields are available in this section.

Personnel: Lists all Department personnel involved in the operation, including their role (e.g., tactics, supervision, CNT), SWAT status, serial number, name, rank, injuries, fatalities, and a free-text comment section for further notes.

AB 481 / Equipment Information:²⁵ Documents the use of military-grade equipment, including chemical agents, less-lethal options, specialized tools, and vehicles.

Incident Timeline: Tracks approximately 30 event categories with associated subcategories, including the timing of warnings, chemical agent deployment (by type and number), entries, suspect custody status, CNT outcomes, log information, audio or video recordings, and details on post-incident debriefs and Risk Management notifications.

The OIG reviewed 15 AARs – including the operations the OIG directly observed – and found the system to be thorough and captured a significant and accurate amount of operational data. This level of detail supported meaningful analysis of SWAT operations and facilitates informed decision making for future improvements.

Of the 15 AARs reviewed by the OIG, only one instance of data entry inconsistency was identified. In that case, the Narrative section documented that CNT successfully negotiated the suspect's surrender; however, the corresponding CNT Disposition field in the Incident Timeline section was left blank. This type of discrepancy could lead to underreporting CNT's involvement during data analysis, potentially limiting the Department's ability to accurately assess the effectiveness of negotiation tactics.

²⁵ California Assembly Bill 481 (AB 481), known as the Military Equipment Use Policy, requires law enforcement agencies in California to obtain governing body approval prior to acquiring or deploying certain types of military equipment. This law is intended to enhance transparency and accountability in the use of such equipment.

IX. OIG OVERALL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LOW USE OF FORCE

Findings:

SWAT's use of force—both less-lethal and lethal—remains notably low in the incidents reviewed by the OIG and in the Department's ten-year review of SWAT operations. This consistent pattern reflects the unit's disciplined and measured approach to resolving high-risk situations. SWAT prioritizes de-escalation and negotiation and employs tactics designed to minimize the use of force whenever possible. Even in incidents involving armed or barricaded suspects, SWAT demonstrates restraint and a clear intent to resolve situations without resorting to force unless necessary. This finding underscores the team's alignment with Department policy emphasizing the preservation of life.

When force is used, SWAT integrates TEMS and LAFD personnel into operations to ensure immediate medical care if injuries occur. In the eight incidents observed by the OIG, TEMS personnel monitored suspects in custody for potential injuries and provided prompt medical attention when needed. Before deploying chemical agents, SWAT consistently consulted with CNT and BSS to confirm that negotiations had reached an impasse, and coordinated with LAFD personnel to assess potential fire risks. When LAFD personnel determined that a particular chemical agent posed a heightened ignition risk, SWAT adjusted its tactics to mitigate that risk. This collaborative approach reflects SWAT's commitment to minimizing harm and safeguarding all involved.

Recommendation: None

TACTICAL TOOLS

Findings:

The OIG observed that SWAT's ability to resolve critical incidents with minimal force is supported by its effective deployment of a wide array of tactical tools. These include less-lethal devices, armored vehicles, chemical agents, aerial support, and negotiation platforms such as the CNT. By using specialized equipment and support resources tailored to each situation, SWAT maximizes operational control and minimizes the likelihood of injury to officers, suspects, and the public. This comprehensive tactical toolkit enables SWAT to maintain a strategic advantage without escalating to higher levels of force.

The integration of drones provides real-time intelligence and visibility, helping SWAT supervisors and ICs make informed tactical decisions while reducing risk to personnel. The availability and coordinated use of these tools demonstrate SWAT's ability to adapt its tactics to changing conditions while maintaining a strong focus on preserving life.

However, during SWAT training, the OIG observed that not all officers were equipped with the same Department-issued NODs. Some officers were issued higher-quality NODs than others. Because all SWAT officers are tasked with critical decision making during operations, the Department should ensure that all SWAT officers are uniformly equipped with high-quality NODs to ensure operational effectiveness and safety.

Recommendation 1:

Ensure all SWAT officers use the same high-quality NODs.

AFTER-ACTION REPORT

Findings:

Although SWAT's After-Action Report (AAR) system is extensive and designed to capture a broad range of operational data, the OIG identified opportunity for improvement.

During high-risk warrant operations, SWAT generates a digital operations plan and distributes hard copies to team members during briefings. But the current Warrant AAR portal cannot upload or attach the digital plan to the corresponding report. As a result, hard copies must be stored in file cabinets, creating duplicative recordkeeping and inefficiencies. Allowing digital operations plans to be uploaded and linked directly to the Warrant AAR would improve efficiency, accessibility, and document retention, while strengthening oversight and audit functions.

The OIG also noted inconsistencies in how certain fields, such as CNT outcomes, are completed across different sections of the report. A more structured validation process, along with post-approval locking mechanisms, would strengthen the credibility and analytical value of the AAR system. Enhancing data accuracy will ultimately support better oversight, training, and accountability.

Recommendation 2:

Enhance the SWAT warrant AAR online portal by adding a feature that allows the upload of supporting documents.

DEPLOYMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Findings:

SWAT's deployment decision-making process is thorough and well-structured, incorporating multiple layers of oversight and approval. Deployment requests must pass through several levels of command review, including the Incident Commander (IC), the requesting Area Captain, and the Metro Captain.

A key component of tactical decision making rests with the Element Leader (Police Officer [PO] III+1), who develops the tactical plan for each operation. Element Leaders serve as subject-matter experts within SWAT and play a vital role in planning, decision making, training, and leadership, ensuring that tactical strategies are sound, safe, and consistent with Department standards. SWAT is currently understaffed by four Element Leader positions and expects additional vacancies because of upcoming retirements.

This multilayered authorization process helps ensure that SWAT resources are deployed only when clearly justified. Close coordination among the SWAT Officer-in-Charge (OIC), supervisors, and requesting Area command staff promotes transparency, accountability, and operational discipline. It is also aligned with Incident Command System (ICS) best practices. In all spontaneous deployments reviewed by the OIG, a Bureau Commander or Deputy Chief was present and served as IC, holding ultimate authority over tactical decisions. However, during the OIG's observation of a pre-planned high-risk arrest warrant operation, the requesting Area Captain or a higher-ranking officer was not present.

Recommendation 3:

Fill the four Element Leader positions to maintain operational needs and ensure consistent leadership.

Recommendation 4:

Reinforce the expectation that the requesting Captain or bureau Staff Officer be present during all SWAT operations.

TECHNOLOGY

Findings:

Many operational and administrative processes still rely on hard-copy documentation and lack modern technological enhancements, limiting SWAT's ability to exercise real-time command and control.

Providing access to the AAR through an online portal would improve the efficiency of preparing, submitting, and reviewing reports. During operational breaks at the Command Post (CP), designated SWAT personnel could use this time to input data directly into the AAR.

The OIG suggests considering integrating live video feeds from Bearcat-mounted cameras and exterior drones. These feeds would provide critical visual information during operations and enable command staff at the CP to make more informed tactical decisions in real time. Modernizing these systems would improve tactical coordination and officer safety. The OIG further suggests expanding the use of technology platforms such as the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), which is already used by other tactical units nationwide. ATAK provides real-time

situational awareness by allowing officers and command staff to track the personnel locations, view operational updates, and share intelligence seamlessly.

Recommendation 5:

Host the AAR through an online portal with access provided on portable digital devices, allowing SWAT personnel to enter data during operational breaks at the CP.

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X. DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

June 23, 2026

1.12

TO: Office of the Inspector General

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REVIEW OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS OPERATIONS

The Los Angeles Police Department (Department) has received the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) draft report of the Review of the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations.

The report includes five recommendations to be made as follows:

SECTION IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.) Ensure all SWAT officers use the same high-quality Night Optical Devices (NODs).
- 2.) Enhance the SWAT warrant After-Action Report (AAR) online portal by adding a feature that allows the upload of supporting documents.
- 3.) Fill the four Element Leader positions to maintain operational needs and ensure consistent leadership.
- 4.) Reinforce the expectation that the requesting Captain or bureau Staff Officer be present during all SWAT operations.
- 5.) Host the AAR through an online portal with access provided on portable digital devices, allowing SWAT personnel to enter data during operational breaks at the CP.

Department Response

The Department agrees with the OIG's recommendations, with specific details as follows:

1. In response to Recommendation No. 1: The Department supports the acquisition of high-quality NODs that are, to the extent possible, uniform or uniformly capable of meeting the specific needs of SWAT personnel.

Office of the Inspector General

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2. In response to Recommendation No. 2: The Department concurs with the OIGs recommendation to increase efficiency, oversight, training, and accountability through the optimization and digitization of its currently utilized programs and databases. Metropolitan Division will work with Information Technology Bureau (ITB) to evaluate the feasibility of using technology to increase efficiency.
3. In response to Recommendation No. 3: The Department agrees with the recommendation to fill Element Leader vacancy as personnel resources allow. The Department has recently approved two additional Element Leader positions and will continue to work to prioritize staffing remaining vacancies during the critical vacancy allocation process.
4. In response to Recommendation No. 4: The Department agrees with the recommendation and will continue to reinforce the expectation of command staff to be present at SWAT operations.
5. In response to Recommendation No. 5: The Department concurs with the recommendation to transition more functionality to digital solutions. Metropolitan Division will work with ITB to evaluate various options, such as the Tactical Awareness Kit (TAK) mentioned by the OIG.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please contact Deputy Chief David Kowalski, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, at (213) 486-8780.

Respectfully,



JIM McDONNELL
Chief of Police

APPENDIX A – Screen Down Sheet

<u>SCREEN DOWN</u>				INC # _____
Tac Sgt: _____	3+1: _____	CNT Supv/Lead: _____	Det: _____	
Date: _____ Time of Screening: _____ Time Inc Originated: _____				
Supervisor at Scene: _____ Division: _____ Telephone: _____ TAC _____				
Incident Location: _____ # _____ Command Post Location: _____				
Crisis Site Description: Fortification? Structure? Floors? Other Tactical Concerns? _____				
<u>Incident Summary:</u> (Crime, Number of Suspects, RAP, Weapons, Threats, Injuries)				
<u>Incident Type:</u> HRT / Barricade / Suicidal Subject / OIS Perimeter / Other _____				
Occupants: Y/N How many: _____ Unwilling/Unable Names? _____ Phone #? _____				
Unaccounted Subjects: Y / N How Many: _____ Efforts to Contact? _____				
Loc of Vict/Wits/PR? _____				
Signed Crime Report? Y / N Title of Crime Report? _____				
Has warrant been written? Y/N Started? Y/N _____				
Suspect/s Name _____				
Descriptors/DOB _____				
Rap/Weapon _____				
Who Owns/Rents Loc? _____				
- Is anyone in contact with the suspect and whom? - Is CP out of line of sight? - What was evacuated and is it documented? - Emergency Response Team in place? Arrest Team? - Is Vehicle Escape concern? - LAFD / RA at scene? Force Protection for LAFD? - Is your W/C and C/O notified? At Scene?				
<u>Notifications:</u>				
- Desk / RACR - Canine - Bomb Squad - BSS / MEU (Always) - Metro Detective - Captains / CTSOB - Fire / TEMS				