

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

June 22, 2026
1.0

BPC #26-170

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General, Police Commission

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT VEHICLE PURSUITS
RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURY OF DEATH

RECOMMENDED ACTION

REVIEW and APPROVE the Inspector General's Report on its Review of Los Angeles Police Department Vehicle Pursuits Resulting in Serious Injury of Death.

DISCUSSION

The OIG conducted a review of Los Angeles Police Department (Department) vehicle pursuits that occurred during the 12-month period from June 1, 2023, through May 31, 2024, and involved a traffic crash resulting in serious injury or death to an officer, suspect, or third party. This report presents data and statistics for those pursuits and analyzes the Department's administrative review and adjudication to identify any inconsistencies with Department policy. The OIG also evaluated the Department's vehicle pursuit training and compared the Department's pursuit policy with the policies of other large urban law enforcement agencies in California. That comparison identifies opportunities to improve the Department's existing policy.

I am available to provide any information the Board may require.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Matthew Barragan", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

MATTHEW BARRAGAN
Inspector General
Police Commission

Attachment

REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT VEHICLE PURSUITS RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH



Conducted by the

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Matthew Barragan

Inspector General

June 22, 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
II.	LAPD VEHICLE PURSUIT POLICY	2
III.	EXISTING STANDARD DEPARTMENT PURSUIT TRAINING	7
IV.	OIG REVIEW OF ADJUDICATED PURSUITS	8
V.	GENERAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION FOR THE 17 VEHICLE PURSUITS	9
	Figure 1 - Data for the 17 Vehicle Pursuits Reviewed	10
	a. Duration, Distance, and Highest Speed	10
	b. Officer, Supervisor, and Air Unit Involvement	11
	c. Claims, Lawsuits, and Related Settlements	12
VI.	ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES FOR THE 17 VEHICLE PURSUITS	12
	a. The OIG agreed with 92% of the Department’s officer classifications (i.e., adjudications) and disagreed with 8%.	13
	b. Most officers who were directed to training following the adjudication had been directed to training for prior pursuits.....	15
VII.	LAPD PURSUIT POLICY COMPARED WITH THREE OTHER LARGE CALIFORNIA URBAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.....	16
VIII.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	18
IX.	DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE	20
APPENDIX A		
SUMMARY OF 15 PURSUITS REVIEWED FOR WHICH THE OIG CONCURRED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S OFFICER CLASSIFICATIONS/ADJUDICATIONS.....		24

REVIEW OF LAPD VEHICLE PURSUITS RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 10, 2024, the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) approved the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Annual Audit Plan for calendar year 2025. The plan included a review of the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD or Department) vehicle pursuits (herein after referred to as "pursuits"). The OIG focused on pursuits that occurred during the 12-month period from June 1, 2023, through May 31, 2024, and that involved a traffic crash resulting in serious injury or death to an officer, suspect, or third party.¹ This report presents data and statistics for those pursuits and analyzes the Department's administrative review and adjudication to identify any inconsistencies with Department policy. The OIG also evaluated the Department's vehicle pursuit training and compared the Department's pursuit policy with the policies of other large urban law enforcement agencies in California. That comparison identifies opportunities to strengthen the Department's existing policy.

Key results and findings of the OIG review are as follows:

- From June 1, 2023, to May 31, 2024, the Department initiated a total of 1,042 pursuits; 373 (36%) resulted in a traffic crash. Of those 373 crashes, 17 (4.5%) resulted in serious injury or death to an uninvolved third party, the suspect, or an occupant of the suspect's vehicle.
- The Department determined that all 17 pursuits were initiated consistent with Department policy. The OIG disagreed in one case and concluded it should have been classified as Out of Policy. The Department found that officers tactics and involvement were appropriate in 10 of the 17 pursuits. The OIG disagreed in two of those cases and concluded that, overall, in nine of 17 pursuits, at least one officer either received or should have received an Administrative Disapproval for their tactics/involvement in the pursuit.
- Of the 93 officers involved in the 17 pursuits, the Department required 73 officers (78%) to attend training. The OIG determined that 54 of those 73 officers had been directed to training for at least one prior pursuit.
- The OIG identified no instances in which emergency medical aid was delayed or rescue ambulances were not requested. However, because vehicle pursuits are initiated by police action and inherently present elevated risk, Department policy should expressly require officers to request a rescue ambulance immediately and render medical aid when tactically safe.
- Neither the Department's annual pursuit-policy training nor its biennial perishable skills training includes behind-the-wheel pursuit or scenario-based instruction. Officers receive

¹ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 432, *Traffic Crash Injury Classification*, states a "Suspected Serious Injury" includes: Any serious incapacitating injury requiring hospitalization; Any injury which prevents the victim from walking or driving; A broken or distorted extremity (arm or leg); Paralysis; Severe laceration; Crush injuries; Severe burns; Suspected skull, chest, or abdominal injury other than bruises or minor lacerations; or unconsciousness when transported from the crash scene.

no such training after the police academy unless directed to do so following a pursuit adjudication.

- The Department's pursuit policy is less restrictive than those of several other large urban law enforcement agencies in California reviewed in this report. It permits officers to initiate pursuits for any misdemeanor (except misdemeanor evading or reckless driving in response to enforcement action by Department personnel) or felony, including offenses that other agencies prohibit as grounds for pursuit.

The report concludes with the following three recommendations:

1. Analyze Department vehicle pursuit data and evaluate whether more restrictive policy requirements for initiating and continuing pursuits would reduce vehicle crashes while maintaining effective law enforcement operations. Also evaluate emerging technologies designed to mitigate the risks associated with vehicle pursuits.

Report back to the BOPC within 120 days.

2. Supplement existing training with scenario-based exercises, case studies, and driving simulators to reinforce the Department's expectation that officers consider all relevant factors when deciding to initiate or continue a pursuit. Assess the feasibility of adding behind-the-wheel pursuit training for field officers and supervisors.
3. Amend the existing pursuit policy to incorporate the current practice requiring Department personnel to render emergency medical aid immediately and request a rescue ambulance for anyone injured during a vehicle pursuit. Require compliance with this to be documented in the narrative portion of the Vehicle Pursuit Report.

II. LAPD VEHICLE PURSUIT POLICY

The Department Manual outlines the policy of the LAPD on employees' responsibilities on all matters related to vehicle pursuits, including initiating a pursuit, continuation/termination of a pursuit, post-pursuit activities, and administrative review and adjudication of a pursuit.

Vehicle Pursuit Defined

The Department Manual uses the California Highway Patrol's definition of a vehicle pursuit: *"An event involving one or more law enforcement officers attempting to apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle while the suspect is attempting to avoid arrest (or detention) by using high speed driving or other evasive tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly, or driving in a legal manner but **willfully failing to yield** to the officer's signal to stop" (emphasis added).*²

² Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 555.01, *Vehicle Pursuit Defined*.

Driver Responsibility

In accordance with the Department Manual and California Vehicle Code (CVC) Section 21055, *“the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is exempt from the “Rules of the Road” [...] in emergency situations when the driver of the vehicle sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary and the vehicle displays a lighted red lamp visible from the front.”*³ However, this exemption *“...does not relieve the driver from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor does it protect him from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted in that Section (21055).”*⁴

Pursuit Administrative Review and Adjudication

The Department Manual outlines the pursuit administrative review process and adjudication classification options used to address the conduct of each employee involved in a pursuit.⁵ The Department evaluates the propriety of the decision to initiate the pursuit (generally limited to officers in the primary unit), as well as the employee’s involvement and tactics (which apply to all officers in any ground unit actively pursuing the suspect vehicle, including the supervisor).

Following each pursuit, the designated supervisor completes a Vehicle Pursuit Report (VPR), which includes specific data such as date, time, location, speed of suspect and officer’s vehicles, duration of the pursuit, air unit involvement, and involved officers.⁶ The supervisor also completes a narrative with an incident overview and other required information but shall not include an opinion regarding the officers’ actions or a policy recommendation. The supervisor submits the VPR to the involved officers’ watch commander who includes his or her insight and a policy recommendation before submitting to the involved officers’ Area/Division commanding officer. Subsequently, the Area/Division commanding officer is required to complete the recommended classifications (i.e., adjudications) section of the VPR and submit the package to the Bureau/Group commanding officer.⁷ After completing their analysis and recommendations, the Bureau/Group commanding officer must submit the package to the Department Traffic Coordinator (DTC).

The DTC is the last person in the pursuit review process and has final adjudication. The DTC, or designee, completes the Final Classification portion of the VPR, noting either concurrence or disagreement with the Bureau/Group recommendations. In general, the pursuit review and adjudication process should be completed within 90 days of the pursuit.⁸

³ Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 555.05, *Driver Responsibility*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 201, *Administrative Review and Adjudication of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

⁶ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.65, *Vehicle Pursuit – Reporting*.

⁷ Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 201, *Administrative Review and Adjudication of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

⁸ In cases where the DTC and Bureau/Group commanding officer disagree on a recommendation, the disagreement must be documented on an Intradepartmental Correspondence and the final classification must be completed within 180 days after the pursuit.

The adjudication classifications for pursuit initiation and involvement/pursuit tactics available to the Area/Division commanding officer in the VPR are:

Initiation:

- In Policy
 - No Further Action Taken
 - Training
- Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy
 - Formal Training
 - Notice to Correct Deficiencies
 - Personnel Complaint

Involvement/Pursuit Tactics:

- Administrative Approval
 - No Further Action Taken
 - Training
- Administrative Disapproval
 - Formal Training
 - Notice to Correct Deficiencies
 - Personnel Complaint

Initiation of a Vehicle Pursuit

Findings related to the decision to initiate a pursuit will generally only apply to officers in the primary unit. The Department's pursuit policy authorizes officers to *pursue felons and misdemeanants, including law violators who exhibit behaviors of illegally driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. If reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists that a misdemeanor (with the exception of misdemeanor evading or reckless driving in response to enforcement action by Department personnel) or felony has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, employees may pursue a suspect vehicle.*⁹

The policy states that officers are prohibited from initiating a pursuit *based only on an infraction, misdemeanor evading (including failure to yield), or reckless driving in response to enforcement action taken by Department personnel.*¹⁰

In addition, the policy requires officers to weigh the seriousness of the suspects' offense against the dangers to themselves and the community. Officers are encouraged to consider the following factors when deciding whether to initiate a pursuit:

- *Whether there is an unreasonable risk to the public's safety, to the pursuing officers' safety or the safety of the occupant(s) in the fleeing vehicle;*

⁹ Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 555.10, *Initiation of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

- *The speed of the fleeing vehicle, relative to other roadway conditions;*
- *Whether vehicular and/or pedestrian traffic safety is unreasonably compromised;*
- *The traffic conditions: volume of vehicular traffic, volume of pedestrian traffic, and road conditions;*
- *Nature of the area of the pursuit: residential, commercial, or rural;*
- *Whether the suspect can be apprehended at a later time;*
- *If weather conditions such as rain, fog, snow, etc., create an unreasonable risk of injury to the public or the pursuing officers;*
- *The seriousness of the crime and its relationship to community safety;*
- *Whether the lack or quality of communication between the primary unit and Communications Division or the primary unit and a supervisor causes an unreasonable risk to the public; and,*
- *The familiarity of the primary pursuing unit with the area of the pursuit.*¹¹

Involvement in, and Pursuit Tactics

All officers in any ground unit actively pursuing the suspect vehicle, including supervisors, are assessed on their pursuit-related tactics pursuant to Department policy, procedures, and guidelines outlined the Department Manual.¹² The relevant policies include but are not limited to:

- Command and control
- Tactical planning
- Tactical communication
- Use of resources, such as air unit and tracking
- Continuation and termination of a pursuit
- Driving tactics
- Use and request of equipment
- Vehicle intervention techniques used
- Pursuit discipline.¹³

Continuation and Termination of the Pursuit¹⁴

Department policy requires that all officers involved in a pursuit *continually evaluate the necessity for continuing the pursuit*.¹⁵ Similar to considerations during the initiation of a pursuit, officers must *determine whether the seriousness of the initial violation or any subsequent*

¹¹ Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 555.10, *Initiation of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

¹² Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 201, *Administrative Review and Adjudication of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

¹³ See <https://www.lapdonline.org/lapd-manual/>, Volume 4 – *Communications*, Section 205 – *Vehicle Pursuit Procedures*, for copy of the complete policies.

¹⁴ Later in this report, the OIG completed a comparative review of LAPD policies on pursuit initiation, continuation, and termination with those of other agencies.

¹⁵ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.17, *Continuation/Termination of the Pursuit*.

*violations reasonably warrants continuance of the pursuit.*¹⁶ Department policy encourages officers to consider the following factors *when evaluating speeds throughout a pursuit and assessing whether to continue or terminate a pursuit:*¹⁷

- *Whether there is an unreasonable risk of injury to the public's safety, the pursuing officers' safety, or the safety of the occupant(s) in the fleeing vehicle;*
- *Whether speeds dangerously exceed the normal flow of traffic;*
- *Whether vehicular and/or pedestrian traffic safety is unreasonably compromised;*
- *Whether the suspects can be apprehended at a later time;*
- *If the weather conditions such as rain, fog, snow, etc., create an unreasonable risk of injury to the public or the pursuing officers;*
- *The suspect is not responding to the emergency equipment, e.g., siren and red lights of the police vehicle; is not accelerating to get away from the officer; and the only known reason for initiating a pursuit is a minor traffic infraction;*
- *The seriousness of the crime and its relationship to community safety;*
- *The traffic conditions: Volume of vehicular traffic, volume of pedestrian traffic and road conditions;*
- *Nature of the area of the pursuit: residential, commercial, or rural;*
- *Whether the lack or quality of communication between the primary unit and Communications Division or the primary unit and a supervisor causes an unreasonable risk to the public;*
- *The familiarity of the primary pursuing officer with the area;*
- *The availability of an air unit; and,*
- *The loss of the pursued vehicle, or unknown location of the pursued vehicle.*

The Department's policy states that all officers, including the passengers of involved vehicles, will be *held accountable for the continuation of a pursuit when circumstances indicate it should have been discontinued.*¹⁸ Since the driver officer is typically focused on the operation of the police vehicle, *passenger officers are particularly responsible for advising the driver when they feel the pursuit is exceeding reasonable limits.*¹⁹

Note 1: On July 1, 2025, the BOPC approved the Department's Special Order No. 5-2025, so as to amend pursuit-related Department Manual Sections 1/555.10 and 4/205.15. As stated by the Department: *"The purpose of this Order is to revise the tracking mode procedures during a vehicle pursuit regarding the responsibilities of officers, supervisors, and Air Support Division personnel. In addition, this Order adds the task of monitoring a suspect's vehicle by an air unit after discontinuance of a vehicle pursuit."* Although this revised policy reemphasizes that the "balance test" should be applied when deciding whether to initiate a pursuit, it does not add to or remove any of the previously identified pursuit-initiation factors.

¹⁶ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.17, *Continuation/Termination of the Pursuit.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Note 2: The Department's vehicle pursuit policy does not include the existing practice that officers/supervisors immediately render emergency medical aid and request a rescue ambulance for anyone injured as a result of a vehicle pursuit.²⁰ However, in the 17 pursuits reviewed, the OIG did not identify any instances of emergency medical aid not being immediately rendered or rescue ambulances not being requested.

III. EXISTING STANDARD DEPARTMENT PURSUIT TRAINING

Academy Training

Department recruits receive approximately 40 hours of driver training, which includes a combination of classroom and in-car instruction, during the 28-week police academy. During the 40 hours of driver training, recruits must demonstrate proficiency in the law and policy, as well as emergency driving that includes intersection clearance, pursuit driving, skid recovery, crash avoidance, and slow speed driving. The 40 hours includes 2 hours of training in a driving simulator, which offers emergency driving and pursuit scenarios used to reinforce the Department's policy.

Annual Pursuit Policy Training

The CVC provides a public agency immunity from liability for civil damages for injury, death, or property damage resulting from a vehicle crash so long as the agency adopts and promulgates a written policy related to pursuits and provides regular and periodic training.²¹

To meet the CVC mandate, the Department requires officers to complete a 2-hour, on-line training annually through the Department's Learning Management System (LMS). To gain a better understanding of the required course, OIG staff participated in the LMS training, which consists of a computer-generated voice reading the policy sections on each slide. There are some portions of the training that include a "live" presenter discussing certain sections of the policy; but overall, the computer-generated voice reading the policy sections made it difficult to engage in the topics. The course includes a simple, basic quiz with 11 multiple choice and true or false questions. At the end of the training, there are links to five Department videos: Street Racing Takeovers, Vehicle Pursuit Safety (Parts 1 and 2), and Training Highlights Vehicle Pursuit Safety and Tactics (Parts 1 and 2). The videos were informative, but their viewing is not required to complete the training; therefore, it is unknown how many officers who complete and pass the required training view the additional training videos.

²⁰ Department Manual Volume 4, Section 210.15, *Requesting Emergency Medical Services*, already establishes a requirement for Department personnel to *request a rescue ambulance for any suspect, arrestee, or any other person requesting emergency medical treatment or when it is apparent that he or she is in need of such assistance and is unable to request a rescue ambulance*. However, this requirement should be clearly articulated in the vehicle pursuit policy, given that pursuits are initiated by police action and inherently involve high-risk situations.

²¹ California Vehicle Code, Section 17004.7.

The annual training covered the policy regarding the requirement to apply the balance test prior to initiating and during the pursuit but did not include any practical examples or scenarios to help illustrate the application of the balance test. The balance test is highly subjective and depends on multiple factors that are impossible to recreate. Training should therefore include scenarios or real-life examples of pursuits in which the balance test was applied both properly and improperly to clarify the Department's expectations during a pursuit.

Perishable Skills Training

The State of California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) mandates minimum training requirements for peace officers in five different perishable skills categories, including a minimum of four hours every two years in Driver Training/Awareness. The minimum standards for driver training include safety policy/orientation, policy, legal and moral issues, vehicle dynamics, defensive driving, intersection exercises, backing/parking exercises, behind-the-wheel exercises to improve driving skills – judgment and decision making, and class exercises.²²

The Department's Training Division staff informed the OIG that the Department provides four hours of driver training/awareness to officers every two years as required by POST. According to training staff, the four hours of training includes policy and procedure lecture updates, slow-speed driving skills with cone patterns, and parallel parking but does not include behind-the-wheel EVOC (emergency vehicle operations course) and pursuit-driving training.

Directed Training

Following an Administrative Disapproval classification in the adjudication of a pursuit, an officer may be ordered to "formal" training, which includes remedial training with an instructor at the Department's Davis Training Center to address the specific deficiencies.

IV. OIG REVIEW OF ADJUDICATED PURSUITS

From June 1, 2023, to May 31, 2024, the Department initiated a total of 1,042 pursuits, 373 (36%) of which resulted in a traffic crash. Of these 373 crashes, 121 resulted in an injury, but only 17 of 373 (4.5%) resulted in serious injury or death to an uninvolved third party, the suspect, or an occupant of the suspect's vehicle; no officers were seriously injured or died.

To assess the Department's compliance with its pursuit policies, procedures, and training, the OIG reviewed the Department's VPR package, digital in-car video (DICV) recording for each involved unit, and body-worn video (BWV) recording for each officer involved in the 17 pursuits that resulted in serious injury or death. To better understand the Department's pursuit policy,

²² California Code of Regulations, Title 11, Section 1005, *Minimum Standards for Training*.

OIG staff attended Department trainings, including: (a) training to new watch commanders related to pursuits,²³ (b) training to new recruits related to emergency vehicle operation and pursuits,²⁴ and (c) the on-line 2025 Annual Vehicle Pursuit training.²⁵

V. GENERAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION FOR THE 17 VEHICLE PURSUITS

The OIG determined that for more than half of the 17 pursuits reviewed (10 of 17), officers initiated the pursuits for a stolen vehicle.²⁶ For three of 17 pursuits, officers initiated the pursuits for reckless driving. For the remaining four pursuits, officers initiated the pursuit for one incident each of: driving under the influence, carjacking, shooting suspect, and stolen property.

The following figure shows that the OIG found that more uninvolved members of the public were impacted by the traffic crashes than suspects and occupants of suspect vehicles. There were also a significant number of third-party vehicles damaged during the pursuit crashes. In total, the pursuits resulted in 17 individuals with serious injuries and five deaths.

[THIS AREA LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

²³ OIG staff attended the Department's watch commander training related to vehicle pursuits in March 2025.

²⁴ OIG staff attended the Department's academy training related to vehicle pursuits in February and March 2025.

²⁵ OIG staff completed the Department's online Annual Vehicle Pursuit training in April 2025.

²⁶ These nine pursuits originated from:

- Request for service for reported stolen vehicle (two cases).
- Notification of an Automated License Plate Recognition "hit" of a stolen vehicle in their vicinity (two cases).
- Direct observation of reckless or unsafe driving, or other suspicious activity potentially indicative of criminal conduct, prompted officers to use Department resources to determine whether the involved vehicle was stolen (five cases).

Figure 1 - Data for the 17 Vehicle Pursuits Reviewed

Data Description	No./Unit
Uninvolved members of the public impacted by the traffic crashes ²⁷	39 individuals
Suspects and occupants of suspect vehicles involved in the traffic crashes	30 individuals
Uninvolved members of the public who died from the traffic crashes	1 individual
Uninvolved members of the public seriously injured from the traffic crashes	7 individuals ²⁸
Suspects and occupants of suspect vehicles who died from the traffic crashes	4 individuals
Suspects and occupants of suspect vehicles seriously injured from the traffic crashes	10 individuals
Third-party vehicles involved in the traffic crashes	36 vehicles
Suspect vehicles involved in the traffic crashes	17 vehicles

a. Duration, Distance, and Highest Speed

The VPR includes basic pursuit information, including the duration²⁹ and distance of the pursuit, and the estimated highest speed for the primary officer and suspect.³⁰

The Department determined that the duration of the 17 pursuits ranged from 12 seconds to 9.5 minutes – with seven (41%) less than one minute, seven (41%) from one to five minutes, and three (18%) over five minutes.

The distance of the pursuits ranged from 0.1 to 8.5 miles – with seven (41%) less than one mile, six (35%) from one to five miles, and four (24%) over five miles.

The suspects' estimated highest speed in the 17 pursuits ranged from 45 to 130 miles per hour (mph) – with one (6%) less than 50 mph, 10 (59%) from 51 to 70 mph, and six (35%) over 71 mph. The officers' estimated highest speed in the 17 pursuits ranged from 40 to 91 mph – with two (12%) less than 50 mph, ten (59%) from 51 to 70 mph, and five (29%) over 71 mph.

²⁷ This includes third-party vehicle drivers, passengers, and bicyclists who were impacted by the crashes but not necessarily injured.

²⁸ Many individuals involved in the crashes who complained of pain were transported to a hospital; but the Department would not have known if a physician subsequently diagnosed this complaint of pain as a serious injury. Thus, there could have been more than 7 individuals with serious injuries.

²⁹ The Department calculates the duration of the pursuit from the time the primary officer(s) initiates the pursuit to the termination, which in 16 of the 17 pursuits occurred when the suspect crashed into another vehicle or fixed object. In one incident, the pursuit terminated when the primary unit crashed into a fixed object.

³⁰ The highest speeds for the suspect are estimated by the officer(s) in the primary unit. Only the primary unit's highest speed is included on the VPR and is estimated by the officer unless the unit's speedometer is visible from the officer's BWV.

b. Officer, Supervisor, and Air Unit Involvement

Department policy requires the pursuit initiating officers to advise Communications Division (CD) that they are “in pursuit” and give the unit’s identification, location, a description of the pursued vehicle and/or suspects, directions taken, and reason for pursuit. Communications Division is responsible for assigning a secondary unit, air unit, and an available supervisor. The senior officer of the primary unit is responsible for maintaining control of the pursuit until a supervisor arrives and can authorize additional units to join the pursuit.³¹

In the 17 pursuits reviewed, eight pursuits involved a single police unit, mostly attributable to the short duration – all eight pursuits ended within five minutes. In seven other pursuits, from two to six police units were involved. In the remaining two of 17 pursuits, eight police units were involved.

Department policy requires a supervisor assigned to a pursuit to respond immediately and, upon arrival, declare themselves as the incident commander (IC) to CD. The IC is responsible for the management and control of the pursuit and related post-incident management. The IC shall monitor the pursuit and continuously assess the situation and ensure that the pursuit is conducted within Department guidelines. If necessary, the supervisor shall direct specific units out of the pursuit, reassign the primary or secondary units, assign an available air unit, terminate the pursuit, or determine the necessity of employing a vehicle intervention technique.

In the 17 pursuits reviewed, the OIG determined that a Department supervisor responded to and monitored 15 (88%) pursuits. The two pursuits not monitored by a supervisor lasted less than one minute.

In January 2024, the Department implemented a livestream pilot program³² which provides a watch commander, or other Department supervisor, the ability to livestream a pursuit remotely through the DICV of the involved units and provide direction to officers regarding the continuation or termination of the pursuit. The OIG determined that seven of the 17 pursuits reviewed occurred after the January 2024 implementation date. However, the Department does not require supervisors to document the use of the livestream feature in the VPR. Therefore, the OIG could not determine whether a supervisor livestreamed any of the seven pursuits initiated after the implementation date.³³

³¹ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.10, *Control of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

³² Office of the Chief of Police Notice, *Digital In-Car Video System Live-Streaming of Vehicle Pursuits – Pilot Program*, January 17, 2024.

³³ The pilot program Notice states that a separate Special Order will be published that will revise the Watch Commander’s Daily Report and the Vehicle Pursuit Report to include a checkbox to indicate whether a supervisor utilized the livestream. The Department’s Pursuit Review Unit reported to the OIG that the project is currently with the Department’s Constitutional Policing and Policy Bureau.

The pursuit policy at the time the 17 pursuits occurred, stated that, when possible, an air unit shall respond to the pursuit and assume responsibility for tracking, if requested by the IC.³⁴ To assist the IC in controlling the pursuit, the air unit shall assume pursuit broadcast responsibilities during tracking mode and advise the IC regarding the suspect's actions and applicable tactical considerations.³⁵

The air unit responded to only six (35%) pursuits and initiated tracking mode in five (83%) of these six.³⁶ The air unit did not respond to the other 11 pursuits due to their short duration. For context, the air unit responded to and initiated tracking mode in 246 (24%) of the 1,042 pursuits initiated from June 1, 2023, to May 31, 2024.

c. Claims, Lawsuits, and Related Settlements

The Department's Risk Management and Legal Affairs Division (RMLAD) confirmed that three (18%) of the 17 pursuits resulted in a total of seven claims filed against the City of Los Angeles (City) for damages, all of which were denied. The RMLAD further confirmed as of the date of this report that no lawsuits related to the 17 pursuits reviewed had been filed against the City nor had the City offered or paid any settlements pertaining to these 17 pursuits.³⁷

VI. ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES FOR THE 17 VEHICLE PURSUITS

Overall, the OIG agreed with the Department's officer final classifications for 15 pursuits and disagreed with the Department's final classifications for two pursuits.³⁸ For the 15 pursuits, the Department classified the pursuit initiations as follows:

- 12 pursuits determined to be In Policy, No Further Action Taken
- three pursuits determined to be In Policy, Training

Regarding the officers' tactics/involvement during the 15 pursuits, the Department found:

- four pursuits resulted in Administrative Approval, No Further Action Taken for all involved officers;
- four pursuits resulted in Administrative Approval, Training for at least one officer; and,
- seven pursuits included findings of Administrative Disapproval, Formal Training for at least one officer.

³⁴ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.15, *Air Support Tracking a Pursuit*. The Department revised this section in July 2025 to require officers in the air unit to initiate tracking without delay after arriving on scene of a pursuit.

³⁵ Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205.15, *Air Support/Tracking a Pursuit*.

³⁶ In the remaining pursuit, the air unit continued to follow the suspect and broadcasted the suspect's location and direction of travel; but because the suspect evaded the ground units, the air unit did not advise they were available for tracking. The suspect crashed before the ground units re-established their position.

³⁷ See Appendix A for a description of the specific claims which are detailed within the summary of each incident.

³⁸ See Appendix A for a summary of each of the 15 incidents.

For the remaining two pursuits, the Department determined the initiation of both pursuits to be In Policy – No Further Action; however, the OIG disagreed with the Department’s determination in one pursuit. Further, the Department determined the officers’ tactics/involvement in both pursuits to be consistent with Department policy (Administrative Approval); however, the OIG disagreed in both cases and opined the appropriate classification for all involved officers should have been Administrative Disapproval.

a. The OIG agreed with 92% of the Department’s officer classifications (i.e., adjudications) and disagreed with 8%.

This review determined that 93 officers were involved in the 17 pursuits. All 93 involved officers received findings for involvement/tactics, but only the primary unit officers received findings for pursuit initiation. Therefore, the 17 pursuits resulted in a total of 130 final classifications for the 93 officers. The OIG agreed with 120 (92%) of these classifications and disagreed with 10 (8%). The ten classification disagreements (two for Initiation and eight for Involvement/Tactics) pertain to two of the 17 pursuits. The following detailed narratives relate to each of the two pursuits/incidents the OIG disagreed with the Department.

Pursuit No. 1 [DR No. 24-9914738, Inc. No. 24042400673]

On April 24, 2024, at approximately 0610 hours, officers responded to an individual’s report that her Apple AirPods were stolen from her vehicle, and she tracked the AirPods to the suspect’s location. Two units responded to the suspect’s location, and officers in one of the units attempted a traffic stop on the suspect’s vehicle that was stopped in a driveway in a mixed residential/commercial area. The officers requested backup, a supervisor, and an air unit. One of the officers in the second unit could be heard on BWV stating, “My God, it’s AirPods.” The officers in the primary unit ordered the suspect out of the vehicle, but the suspect sped away and entered a residential area, reaching speeds of 70 mph. The pursuit traversed approximately one mile and lasted just over one minute. The pursuit terminated after the suspect struck and killed a bicyclist and crashed into several third-party vehicles, causing his car to flip over. After a brief foot pursuit, officers arrested the suspect who died in custody six days later from injuries related to the crash.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action for both primary unit officers. The watch commander noted in his review that the officers could benefit from training in assessing the balance test but concluded their decision to initiate the pursuit was in policy. The OIG disagreed with this finding and opined that the officers should not have initiated the pursuit; as such, both should have received a classification for pursuit initiation of Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy. While the policy allows officers to pursue suspects of misdemeanor crimes, the threat to public safety far outweighed the minor property crime and the fact that the reporting party tracked the AirPods to the suspect’s location, so officers could have continued to track the AirPods and attempt to apprehend the suspect at a safer location instead of initiating a pursuit.

The Department classified the involvement/tactics of the driver in the primary unit as Administrative Approval – Training, noting the officer “*could benefit from training in appropriately assessing the ‘Balance Test.’ The apparent stolen item was a pair of iPods [sic]. Although, the material was certainly important to the victim, the safety of the community carries a much greater toll and pursuing a suspect for such items is counterproductive.*” The OIG agreed with the determination that the primary driver did not properly apply the balance test but opined that the classification for pursuit involvement/tactics should have been Administrative Disapproval. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of the passengers in both the primary and secondary vehicles as Administrative Approval – No Further Action. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of the driver of the secondary vehicle as Administrative Approval – Training, based on the officer running past the suspect’s vehicle while in foot pursuit without clearing the suspect’s vehicle. These three officers were in a position to decide to terminate the pursuit and should have been accountable in accordance with Department policy, which states that *all officers involved in a vehicle pursuit will be held accountable for the continuation of a pursuit when circumstances indicate it should have been discontinued.* Because the driver is typically focused on the operation of the police vehicle, passenger officers are particularly responsible for advising the driver when they feel the pursuit is exceeding reasonable limits. Therefore, the OIG opined that these three officers should have also received a classification for pursuit involvement/tactics of Administrative Disapproval.

Thus, in summary for this pursuit, the OIG opined that two officer classifications for pursuit initiation should have been Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy (instead of Administrative Approval) and four officer classifications for pursuit involvement/tactics should have been Administrative Disapproval (instead of Administrative Approval).

Two individuals filed claims against the City for damages related to this pursuit. One of the individuals filed a claim for property damage to his vehicle and the other filed a claim for personal injury. The City denied both claims. To date, no lawsuits have been filed.

Pursuit No. 2 [DR 23-9928783, Inc. No. 231024001376]

On October 24, 2023, at approximately 0945 hours, officers responded to a radio call for a stolen vehicle being tracked by the owner, a rental car company. The officers broadcast that they were following the vehicle on the freeway – not yet in pursuit at this time – and requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor. A second unit and a supervisor joined; but before the officers could initiate a stop, the suspect accelerated in an attempt to evade the officers. Officers in both units and the supervisor began to pursue the suspect on the freeway. The pursuit traversed approximately 1¾ miles and lasted just over one minute. The suspect reached a speed on the freeway of 110 mph before colliding with a cement barrier at a freeway exit. The suspect was the sole occupant of the vehicle, and no other vehicles were involved in the crash. Officers arrested the suspect, who sustained a dislocated knee.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action, and the OIG agreed.

The Department classified the involvement/tactics of the officers in the primary unit, Administrative Approval – Training, noting that the tactics used during the pursuit did not constitute a substantial deviation from Departmental tactics and pursuit practices but noted that *“training concerns have been identified specific to pursuit driving practices, the utilization of the balance test against the suspect’s reckless driving, and best practices regarding pursuit communications.”* The watch commander noted in their review that the officers perceived the suspect to be driving in excess of 110 mph; therefore, the officers should have considered canceling the pursuit as the suspect’s reckless driving placed the officers and the public at *“significant risk of being involved in a traffic collision.”* Based on this analysis, the OIG disagreed with the Administrative Approval classification and opined that Administrative Disapproval was more appropriate.

The Department classified the officers’ involvement/tactics in the second unit as Administrative Approval – No Further Action. The OIG disagreed because the officers in the second unit were in a position to decide to terminate the pursuit and should have been accountable in accordance with Department policy, which states that *all officers involved in a vehicle pursuit will be held accountable for the continuation of a pursuit when circumstances indicate it should have been discontinued.* The Department classified the supervisor’s involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training, noting the sergeant was in a position as the IC to determine the suspect’s speed was excessive and to terminate the pursuit. The adjudication further noted *“this is a minor training concern.”*

One factor not considered in the Department’s review that lends further support to terminating the pursuit is that the victim of the stolen vehicle (the rental car company) was tracking the vehicle, thereby giving the officers an opportunity to track the vehicle to a location where officers could apprehend the suspect in a safer manner.

Thus, in summary for this pursuit, the OIG opined that four officer classifications for pursuit involvement/tactics should have been Administrative Disapproval instead of Administrative Approval.

To date, no claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

b. Most officers who were directed to training following the adjudication had been directed to training for prior pursuits.

In the 17 pursuits reviewed, a total of 93 officers received an adjudication for their involvement/tactics. Of these 93 officers, the Department assigned 20 officers (22%) a classification of Administrative Approval – No Further Action Taken, 44 officers (47%) a classification of Administrative Approval – Training, and 29 officers (31%) a classification of Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training. Combined, 73 officers (78%) received an

adjudication for which the Department directed training related to their involvement/pursuit tactics.

The OIG reviewed the Department's Training and Evaluation System (TEAMS) II for each of the 73 officers who received a directed-training adjudication, and the OIG determined that 54 of the officers (74%) had been directed to training for at least one prior pursuit. The Department's review and adjudication policy for pursuits does not require adjudicators to formally consider the adjudications of previous pursuits when determining appropriate actions. However, the Department's Pursuit Review Unit advised the OIG that although an officer's compliance with policy and training is evaluated specific to each pursuit, their prior pursuit history is considered when determining appropriate corrective measures (when applicable).

VII. LAPD PURSUIT POLICY COMPARED WITH THREE OTHER LARGE CALIFORNIA URBAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The OIG compared the Department's pursuit policy with three other large California urban law enforcement agencies and determined that the LAPD's policy is less restrictive in that LAPD officers are permitted to initiate pursuits for less serious suspected crimes.

The CVC requires that an agency pursuit policy articulate the reasons for which a pursuit is authorized and identify the issues that should be considered in reaching the decision to pursue.³⁹ It should also address the importance of protecting the public and balancing the known or reasonably suspected offense, and the apparent need for immediate capture against the risks to peace officers, innocent motorists, and others. The CVC, however, does not specify circumstances (e.g., felony or misdemeanor) for which agencies may initiate a pursuit.

The LAPD pursuit policy authorizes officers to pursue *"felons and misdemeanants, including law violators who exhibit behaviors of illegally driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. If reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists that a misdemeanor (with the exception of misdemeanor evading or reckless driving in response to enforcement action by Department personnel) or felony has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, employees may pursue a suspect vehicle."*⁴⁰

Department policy specifically prohibits officers from initiating a pursuit based only on an infraction, misdemeanor evading (including failure to yield), or reckless driving in response to enforcement action taken by Department personnel. Impliedly, officers may initiate a pursuit for any other misdemeanor crime, including non-violent crimes such as petty theft, shoplifting, trespassing, and drug possession.

The OIG compared LAPD's pursuit policy with the policies of the following three large California urban law enforcement agencies: Long Beach Police Department, Los Angeles

³⁹ California Vehicle Code, Section 17004.7(c)(1).

⁴⁰ Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 555.10, *Initiation of a Vehicle Pursuit*.

County Sheriff's Department, and San Jose Police Department.⁴¹ While the policies related to pursuit tactics are largely similar for all agencies, several agencies include more restrictive language related to when officers are permitted to initiate and continue a pursuit.

Long Beach Police Department (LBPd)

The LBPd's pursuit policy⁴² authorizes officers to initiate a pursuit in the following circumstances: 1) The officer has reasonable cause to believe that the suspect he/she is attempting to arrest has committed, is about to commit, or is threatening to commit a felony crime; and 2) The officer, prior to initiating the pursuit, has reasonable cause to believe that the driving ability of the suspect is so impaired that the suspect may cause death or serious injury to another person.

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)

The LASD's policy⁴³ authorizes deputies to initiate a pursuit under the following circumstances:

- Known or suspected serious felony, which includes the attempt or act of murder, mayhem, serious or violent sex crimes, robbery, arson, kidnapping, carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary (including commercial burglary that results in significant loss or is determined to be part of a serial crime), major narcotics violations, and terrorist acts;
- A confirmed grand theft, vehicle; or,
- Misdemeanor suspects only in the following situations:
 - Where the suspect(s) has been observed by a deputy or reliable witness to be displaying a firearm in an assaultive manner reasonably contemporaneous to the initiation of the pursuit; or,
 - Where there is reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or is otherwise impaired, and the suspect's driving prior to the attempted stop is so flagrantly reckless that it presents a clear and present danger to other users of the highway, and failure to apprehend the violator would likely pose an imminent and life-threatening danger to the public. Examples of such flagrantly reckless driving include but are not limited to collisions with other vehicles or objects, forcing other vehicles to take evasive action to avoid collision, failure to stop at controlled intersections without slowing, or driving on the wrong side of the highway.

The LASD policy specifically prohibits deputies from initiating or continuing a pursuit once it has been determined the driver is refusing or failing to yield and the only known reason for the intended stop is an infraction, a possible grand theft vehicle, or an infraction or misdemeanor except as provided above. Regarding pursuit termination, the OIG noted that LASD pursuit

⁴¹ These agencies were selected based on their size and similar urban setting to LAPD.

⁴² Long Beach Police Department, Special Order 2023-5, 7.1.7, *Vehicle Pursuits*.

⁴³ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Department Manual of Policy and Procedures, Volume 5, Chapter 9, Section 210.00, *Pursuits*.

policy includes specific guidance when the suspect and/or deputy's speed becomes unreasonable. According to the policy, speeds in excess of 20 mph over the posted speed limit on urban or suburban surface streets would normally be considered unreasonable and would require terminating the pursuit absent a violent felony or articulable need to continue the pursuit.

San Jose Police Department (SJPd)

The SJPd's policy⁴⁴ authorizes the initiation of a pursuit only when the officer articulates the following factors are present:

- When the violator does not stop, and the driving behavior is reasonably perceived as being non-hazardous, (i.e., the violator is mindful of other persons' safety, the vehicle code, and is traveling at reasonable speeds for the conditions of the traffic and roadway), unless the circumstances change that would make it unsafe to continue and/or the violator begins driving without due care for the safety of others; or,
- When the violator is believed to be a violent felon who poses a significant, ongoing threat to public safety. Personnel may continue the pursuit unless the specific facts and circumstances change to the point that the danger or serious injury posed by the pursuit to other motorists and pedestrians outweighs the need to apprehend the violator. The seriousness of the offense and the threat posed by the fleeing suspect(s) must justify the pursuit. When initiating or continuing a pursuit, officers should continually weigh the seriousness of the offense(s) against the potential dangers to themselves and members of the community.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its review and findings, the OIG recommends the BOPC direct the Chief of Police to:

1. Analyze Department vehicle pursuit data and evaluate whether more restrictive policy requirements for initiating and continuing pursuits would reduce vehicle crashes while maintaining effective law enforcement operations. Also evaluate emerging technologies designed to mitigate the risks associated with vehicle pursuits.

Report back to the BOPC within 120 days.

2. Supplement existing training with scenario-based exercises, case studies, and driving simulators to reinforce the Department's expectation that officers consider all relevant factors when deciding to initiate or continue a pursuit. Assess the feasibility of adding behind-the-wheel pursuit training for field officers and supervisors.

⁴⁴ SJPd Duty Manual (Public Version) § L2103.

3. Amend the existing pursuit policy to incorporate the current practice requiring Department personnel to render emergency medical aid immediately and request a rescue ambulance for anyone injured during a vehicle pursuit. Require compliance with this to be documented in the narrative portion of the Vehicle Pursuit Report.

[THIS AREA LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

IX. DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

June 4, 2026

1.12

TO: Office of the Inspector General

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REVIEW OF LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S VEHICLE PURSUITS RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD or Department) has received the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) draft report of the Los Angeles Police Department's Vehicle Pursuits Resulting in Serious Injury or Death.

The report includes three recommendations to be made as follows:

SECTION VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Analyze Department vehicle pursuit data and evaluate whether more restrictive policy requirements for initiating and continuing pursuits would reduce vehicle crashes while maintaining effective law enforcement operations. Also evaluate emerging technologies designed to mitigate the risk associated with vehicle pursuits.
2. Supplement existing training with scenario-based exercises, case studies, and driving simulators to reinforce the Department's expectation that officers consider all relevant factors when deciding to initiate or continue a pursuit. Assess the feasibility of adding behind-the-wheel pursuit training for field officers and supervisors.
3. Amend the existing pursuit policy to incorporate the current practice requiring Department personnel to render emergency medical aid immediately and request a rescue ambulance for anyone injured during a vehicle pursuit. Require compliance with this to be documented in the narrative portion of the Vehicle Pursuit Report.

Department Response

The Department appreciates the OIG's review and agrees in principle with the recommendations. We share the goal of enhancing safety, documentation, and accountability in vehicle pursuits, particularly those resulting in serious injury or death. The Department is already engaged in efforts to improve data analysis, strengthen pursuit training, and evaluate emerging technologies that may reduce risk while supporting effective law enforcement operations. We will continue aligning policy and training with best practices and operational needs. Implementation of the recommendations must remain consistent with established responsibilities and subject-matter expertise. Several elements identified by the OIG reflect practices already in place, and the

Office of the Inspector General

Page 2

1.12

Department will continue to assess and refine these processes to ensure they remain efficient, practical, and effective.

- 1) In response to Recommendation No. 1: The Department has reviewed past analyses to inform its approach to vehicle pursuits. In collaboration with the California Policy Lab (CPL), the Department participated in the Pursuit Data Project, which examined pursuit and arrest data from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2016. This study provided empirical insights into pursuit characteristics, outcomes, and associated risks, supporting evidence-based policy development. Following a comprehensive review of the data, the CPL and the Department concluded that, although vehicle pursuits carry inherent risks, they remain a necessary component of the Department's commitment to public safety.

A central theme of the CPL study, and an ongoing challenge for law enforcement, is balancing crime control and offender apprehension with the safety of all persons potentially affected by vehicle pursuits, including officers, suspects, victims, bystanders, and the broader community. This balancing responsibility remains foundational to the Department's pursuit policy.

Audit Division's recent vehicle pursuit assessment also underscored the need for continued evaluation of pursuit practices, supervisory oversight, training, and emerging technologies to support risk reduction and public safety objectives. This assessment complements prior analyses by identifying operational trends and opportunities for continual improvement, while reaffirming that vehicle pursuits remain an important public safety tool. Accordingly, the Department's already restrictive pursuit policy should remain unchanged.

The Department remains committed to maintaining this balance by continually reviewing pursuit practices and policy requirements to reduce risk while preserving the ability to apprehend offenders and protect public safety. The Department continues to evaluate opportunities for improvement to ensure its pursuit policy reflects accountability, operational realities, and the highest standards of public safety. Additionally, the Department remains committed to proactively identifying and evaluating new and emerging technologies designed to mitigate the risks associated with vehicle pursuits. Intervention techniques and equipment such as the Grappler Police Bumper are continuously assessed to enhance safety for officers, suspects, and the public.

- 2) In response to Recommendation No.2: The Department supports the intent of this recommendation and agrees that scenario-based training, case studies, driving simulators, and behind-the-wheel instruction can enhance pursuit decision-making and reinforce sound judgment during high-risk driving events. However, implementation on a Department-wide scale is not currently feasible given existing resource, staffing, facility, and operational constraints.

Office of the Inspector General

Page 3

1.12

The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) establishes and regulates the curriculum delivered during Recruit Training and mandated in-service instruction. Pursuit-related decision-making concepts are already incorporated into these programs; however, expanding simulator-based and behind-the-wheel training for approximately 8,400 sworn personnel would require significant additional resources beyond current capacity.

The Department's driving simulators are limited in number and primarily dedicated to Recruit Training and specialized programs. Expanding simulator access to all sworn personnel on a recurring basis would create substantial logistical challenges and would require additional equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. Similarly, the EVOC facility is already operating at or near capacity supporting Recruit Training, Motorcycle Officer Training, POST-mandated requirements, and other directed training needs. Current staffing levels meet existing obligations but do not provide the capacity required to develop and deliver large-scale scenario-based driving programs or recurring behind-the-wheel pursuit training for all field personnel and supervisors.

Expanded practical driving instruction would also require significant ongoing expenditures related to instructor staffing, vehicle maintenance, fuel, fleet availability, facility scheduling, and administrative support.

The Department currently mitigates pursuit-related risk through supervisory review, pursuit adjudication processes, TEAMS II intervention strategies, and targeted remedial driver training, ensuring resources are directed toward personnel with the greatest training need.

While large-scale implementation of simulator-based and behind-the-wheel training is not currently feasible, the Department will continue to evaluate alternative and scalable methods to reinforce pursuit decision-making, including scenario-based classroom instruction, case studies, technology-assisted learning, and targeted training interventions that can be delivered within existing resource constraints.

- 3) In response to Recommendation No.3: The Department supports evaluating the Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 205, Vehicle Pursuit Procedures, to include language requiring notification to the Communications Division control operator and assignment of a unit to investigate any collision resulting from a vehicle pursuit. Additionally, when a medical emergency exists, whether injuries or complaints of injuries, a rescue ambulance shall be requested. The rendering of medical aid will also be incorporated into this evaluation to ensure alignment with Department policy and the principle of Reverence for Human Life.

Any policy revisions adopted will be assessed during the vehicle pursuit adjudication process.

Review of LAPD Vehicle Pursuits Resulting in Serious Injury or Death

Page 23

1.0


Office of the Inspector General

Page 4

1.12

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter, please contact Captain Yvonne Ortiz, Commanding Officer, Traffic Coordination Division, at (213) 486-0690.

Respectfully,



JIM McDONNELL
Chief of Police

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF 15 PURSUITS REVIEWED FOR WHICH THE OIG CONCURRED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICER CLASSIFICATIONS/ADJUDICATIONS

Pursuit No. 1 [DR 23-0212721]

On June 19, 2023, at approximately 1411 hours, officers began following a confirmed stolen vehicle and initiated a pursuit after the suspect accelerated away from the officers. Seven additional ground units and the air unit joined the pursuit, which traversed approximately 3½ miles and lasted nearly five minutes. The pursuit terminated after the suspect crashed into a civilian's vehicle with just one occupant. Officers arrested the suspect who sustained a broken pelvis and several broken ribs from the impact of the crash. According to the VPR, the civilian did not sustain any serious injuries. The Department adjudicated the officers' initiation of the pursuit as In Policy – No Further Action. The OIG agreed with the Department. The Department classified the involvement/tactics for the primary and secondary units and the supervisor as Administrative Approval – Training. The adjudication noted the officers did not appropriately apply the balance test, considering the suspect's speed, the time of day, the volume of vehicle and pedestrian traffic, and the property crime. The OIG agreed. For the officers in the remaining five units, the Department adjudicated their pursuit involvement/tactics as Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training due to failure to apply the balance test, passing vehicles on the right, joining the pursuit without authorization from the IC, and taking over the primary role in the pursuit without authorization. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 2 [DR 23-2011827]

On June 21, 2023, at approximately 1845 hours, officers and detectives working on a regional vehicle theft task force located a stolen vehicle with two occupants. Detectives followed the vehicle and requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor. The primary unit arrived and conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle. The driver exited the vehicle but returned to the vehicle and sped away from officers, causing officers to initiate the pursuit. The air unit began tracking approximately two minutes later. A total of four units were engaged in the pursuit, which traversed approximately seven miles and lasted approximately nine minutes. The pursuit terminated when the suspect's vehicle collided with several occupied and unoccupied vehicles. The officers arrested both suspects after a short foot pursuit. According to the VPR, neither suspect sustained serious injuries, but one of the five civilians impacted by the crash sustained a broken scapula.

The Department classified the officers' initiation of the pursuit as In Policy – No Further Action. The OIG agreed. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of seven officers, including the supervisor as Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training. The commanding officer noted several concerns with the officers' actions, including a failure to properly apply the balance test, driving recklessly and at high speeds on city and residential streets, passing vehicles on the right,

driving the wrong direction on a one-way street, and driving through stop signs and red lights without clearing the intersections. The Department ordered the seven officers to EVOC training and revoked the officers' driving privileges for 30 days. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and vehicle crash.

Pursuit No. 3 [DR 23-0613898]

On August 16, 2023, at approximately 0240 hours, officers began following a suspected stolen vehicle and requested backup, an air unit, and supervisor. The officers initiated a traffic stop, but the suspect sped away. The air unit arrived and initiated tracking mode. A total of three units engaged in the pursuit, which traversed approximately eight miles and lasted nearly seven minutes. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 90 mph before colliding with a guard rail on the freeway. No other vehicles were involved in the crash. Officers arrested the suspect for grand theft auto and felony evading arrest. The suspect was ejected from the vehicle and sustained a broken leg and two broken shoulders. The Department classified the initiation of the pursuit as In Policy - Training, noting a delay in broadcasting information and traveling through a red light without activating emergency lights and siren prior to the pursuit. The Department classified the primary and tertiary officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training for violations including, broadcasting the wrong location and direction of travel, traveling through three red tri-phase traffic lights without emergency lights and siren, not clearing intersections, and joining the pursuit without authorization from the IC. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 4 [DR 23-0600902]

On August 27, 2023, at approximately 0111 hours, officers observed and followed a driver suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. The suspect traveled at an unsafe speed and committed several traffic violations, causing officers to initiate a pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately ½ mile on city streets and lasted approximately 30 seconds. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 60 mph before running a red light and colliding with four uninvolved vehicles with five occupants, terminating the pursuit. The four occupants in the suspect's vehicle ran from the scene, but the officers did not foot pursue due to the need to render aid to the individuals impacted by the crash. One of the passengers sustained a lacerated intestine, bladder, and colon, and a broken arm. Due to the brief duration, no other units joined the pursuit.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – Training due to the officers travelling through a four-way stop sign-controlled intersection without activating the emergency lights and siren prior to the pursuit. Additionally, the Department issued a personnel complaint for both officers who were not wearing their seat belts while on patrol prior to initiating the pursuit. The Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training, noting the suspect travelled at a high speed with moderate traffic and committed numerous vehicle code violations. The adjudication further noted that due to the brief pursuit, the officers had very little time to decide whether to continue the pursuit, the officers should

receive training covering the balance test. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 5 [DR 23-0123378]

On November 5, 2023, at approximately 0509 hours, officers began following a suspected stolen van. The van accelerated away from officers and one of the occupants threw an object that appeared to be a pistol out of the window. The officers activated their emergency lights and siren and initiated a pursuit after the suspect sped away. The pursuit traversed approximately ½ mile and lasted approximately 30 seconds. Due to the brief duration, no other units joined the pursuit. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 90 mph, and the pursuit terminated when the suspect crashed into a Metro Transit Authority bus. One of the four occupants in the van died at the scene of the crash, and a second occupant died at the hospital. A third occupant sustained multiple fractures and a punctured lung. The driver of the van sustained minor injuries. According to the VPR, none of the occupants on the bus sustained any injuries. Officers arrested the suspect driver for murder and felony evading arrest resulting in death.

The Department classified the officers' actions related to the pursuit initiation as In-policy - No Further Action and involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval - No Further Action. The OIG agreed with these classifications. The family of one of the deceased occupants in the van filed a claim against the City, which the City denied. To date, no lawsuits have been filed.

Pursuit No. 6 [DR 23-0221715]

On November 28, 2023, at approximately 2158 hours, officers observed two persons in a physical struggle near a pick-up truck parked on a city street. As one of the persons got in the truck and sped away, the other person told the officers he had just been carjacked. The officers initiated a pursuit, which traversed approximately 1/10th of a mile and lasted approximately 12 seconds. Due to the brief duration, no other units joined the pursuit. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 65 mph before running a red light and colliding with one occupied and two unoccupied vehicles, terminating the pursuit. One of the civilians in the occupied vehicle sustained broken ribs and another civilian sustained a possible punctured spleen. Officers arrested the suspect, who sustained no injuries, for carjacking. The Department classified the officers' initiation of the pursuit as In Policy – No Further Action and the involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – No Further Action. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 7 [DR 23-0415304]

On December 13, 2023, at approximately 0309 hours, officers observed a driver commit several traffic violations. The officers attempted a traffic stop, but the driver began traveling at a high speed. The officers considered the balance test and decided not to initiate a pursuit. Several minutes later, the officers observed the same vehicle fail to stop at a red light, nearly colliding with the officers' vehicle. The officers initiated a pursuit, believing the suspect driver may be

under the influence of alcohol, and requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor. No additional ground units joined the pursuit, but the air unit responded and initiated tracking mode within approximately two minutes of the pursuit initiation. The pursuit traversed approximately 3.7 miles, lasted almost four minutes, and the suspect reached a speed of 70 mph. While the air unit and ground unit were in tracking mode, the suspect collided with a third party's vehicle, terminating the pursuit. The suspect driver was the lone occupant in the vehicle and sustained a broken knee as a result of the crash. According to the VPR, neither of the occupants in the third-party vehicle sustained serious injury. Officers arrested the driver for felony evading arrest, stolen vehicle, and narcotics and firearms violations.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action. The Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training for proper intersection clearance during emergency driving. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 8 [DR 24-1007491]

On April 6, 2024, at approximately 0456 hours, officers observed a vehicle (Lamborghini Huracan) stopped at a red traffic light. When the signal turned green, the vehicle remained stationary, and officers observed that the driver appeared to be sleeping. The driver eventually pulled forward and the officers initiated a traffic stop, to which the driver complied by pulling to the side of the street. During the traffic stop, officers determined the vehicle was stolen. When the officers ordered the suspect to exit the vehicle, the suspect refused and sped away, causing the officers to initiate a pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately ½ mile and lasted approximately 35 seconds. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 130 mph before striking a tree. The driver was ejected from the vehicle and died at the scene. No other vehicles were involved in the crash.

The Department classified the officers' initiation of the pursuit as In Policy – No Further Action and the involvement/tactics Administrative Approval – No Further Action. The OIG agreed with these classifications. However, the OIG identified a concern regarding the officers' tactics in the primary unit during the traffic stop. The officers did not order the driver to turn off the ignition or confirm that the vehicle was in "park." The DICV revealed that the brake lights on the suspect's vehicle were illuminated. Additionally, the suspect stopped the vehicle in an angled position, clear from obstruction to be able to easily accelerate away. Officers did not seem aware of the obvious indications of the suspect's intent to flee. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 9 [DR 24-1607346]

On April 10, 2024, at approximately 1244 hours, officers observed a driver commit several unsafe traffic violations. The officers initiated a traffic stop, but the driver sped away, and the officers initiated a pursuit due to the suspect's reckless driving. The pursuit traversed approximately five miles on city streets and freeway, lasted approximately five minutes, and the

suspected reached a speed of 85 mph. No other units joined the pursuit. The air unit responded to the pursuit but never initiated tracking mode because the air unit believed the suspect had evaded the officers on the ground. Shortly after exiting the freeway, the suspect collided with one vehicle in oncoming traffic, terminating the pursuit. Officers removed the unconscious suspect from the vehicle, which had caught fire. The suspect sustained a brain bleed and possible broken arm from the crash and was arrested for felony evading. According to the VPR, the sole occupant of the third-party vehicle involved in the crash sustained minor injuries.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action. The Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training.

The Department concluded the officers did not properly apply the balance test, noting the officers failed to consider the time of day, heavy traffic, seriousness of the offense, and the suspect's recklessness. Additionally, the officers passed multiple vehicles on the right while driving with emergency equipment activated and did not properly clear an intersection. Finally, the officers should have discontinued the pursuit after losing sight of the suspect on the freeway and requested the air unit to monitor the suspect. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 10 [DR 24-1107800]

On May 3, 2024, at approximately 1233 hours, officers received an Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) alert for a reported stolen vehicle. Officers requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor and began following the vehicle. Five additional units joined in the following and a supervisor determined there were sufficient resources to initiate a stop. Officers in the primary unit activated their emergency lights and siren, but the suspect failed to yield and accelerated away to evade the officers, resulting in a pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately one mile through an area heavily populated with pedestrian and vehicle traffic and lasted nearly one minute. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 60 mph and committed several traffic violations before colliding with two occupied vehicles, terminating the pursuit. Due to the brief duration, the air unit was not involved. Officers arrested the suspect driver without incident, and the passenger in the suspect's vehicle was a reported missing juvenile and released to her parents. The suspect driver sustained a dislocated hip in the crash. According to the VPR, neither of the occupants in the other vehicles sustained serious injury.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action. The Department classified the involvement/tactics for the officers in the primary unit as Administrative Disapproval – Formal Training because the officers failed to properly apply the balance test and, given the time of day and vehicle/pedestrian traffic, the officers put their safety and that of the community at unnecessary risk to capture a property crime suspect. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of the officers in the secondary vehicle as Administrative Approval – No Further Action. Regarding the third, fourth, and fifth units, the Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training

because the officers, while initially involved in the following, should have disengaged when the pursuit began. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 11 [DR 24-0509034]

On May 17, 2024, at approximately 1812 hours, officers observed a vehicle driving at a high rate of speed and failed to stop at a stop sign, nearly colliding with another vehicle. The officers activated their emergency lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop, but the suspect accelerated in an attempt to evade. The officers broadcast they were in pursuit of a reckless driver and requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor. During the pursuit, the officers observed an occupant throw a pistol from the vehicle. The pursuit traversed approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile and lasted approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes. The suspect reached a speed of approximately 45 mph before colliding with a building at the corner of an intersection, terminating the pursuit. Due to the short duration, no other units were involved in the pursuit. The officers arrested the driver for felony evading arrest, possession of a firearm, and drug violations. The passenger in the suspect's vehicle sustained a fractured vertebrae from the crash.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy - No Further Action. The Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training, specifically noting the speed of the pursuit (the officers' top speed was 40 mph), not thoroughly clearing controlled intersections, and post-pursuit tactics because the officers momentarily stepped away from cover while ordering the suspects from the vehicle. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 12 [DR 24- 0210311]

On May 30, 2024, at approximately 2335 hours, officers received an ALPR alert for a reported stolen vehicle. The officers located the vehicle; began to follow the vehicle; and requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor. Once the requested resources were in place, the officers in the primary unit activated their emergency lights and siren to conduct a stop. The suspect failed to yield and accelerated through a red tri-phase traffic light to evade the officers, causing the officers to initiate a pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ mile and lasted approximately 30 seconds until the officer driving the primary unit lost control of the vehicle on a turn and collided with a pole and bench on the sidewalk. Other officers in the pursuit stopped to render aid to the officers, but the air unit continued to track the suspect at the IC's direction. The air unit broadcast updates regarding the suspect's location until the suspect collided with a third-party vehicle approximately two minutes later. Officers responded to the location of that crash and arrested the driver for felony evading and the stolen vehicle. The suspect sustained a fractured and dislocated hip from the crash. According to the VPR, the lone occupant of the third-party vehicle did not sustain any serious injuries. The officers were evaluated at the hospital but did not sustain serious injury.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action. The Department classified the involvement/tactics for the officers in the primary unit as Administrative Disapproval – Training, noting the officers drove at an excessive speed, causing the officers to lose control of the vehicle and crash. For the secondary unit, the Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training, noting excessive speed in a residential area and not thoroughly clearing intersections. For the third and fourth units, the Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – Training because the officers initially joined the pursuit believing there were multiple occupants in the suspect vehicle, but a supervisor had not yet authorized the additional units. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 13 [DR 24-0600805]

On May 31, 2024, at approximately 2130 hours, officers responded to a back-up call for a shooting and, while driving through a parking lot in the area of the shooting, observed a person driving a vehicle who matched the suspect's description. The officers followed, then activated their emergency lights and siren to initiate a stop, but the suspect sped away. The officers requested backup, an air unit, and a supervisor who authorized six units in the pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately five miles, lasted just over five minutes, and terminated when the suspect collided with two occupied vehicles. The suspect ran from the scene resulting in a foot pursuit, after which the officers arrested the suspect for assault with a deadly weapon. The suspect sustained minor injuries from the crash and one of the occupants of the vehicles struck by the suspect sustained a broken foot.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – Training, noting the officers in the primary unit failed to state they were in pursuit during their initial broadcast requesting additional resources. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of officers in seven of the involved units, including the supervisor, as Administrative Approval – Training, ordering training for policy review related to the balance test, communications, clearing intersections, and overtaking other units in the pursuit package. The Department classified the involvement/tactics of two officers as Administrative Disapproval – Training, noting that in addition to the concerns identified for the other officers, the *“driving is of great concern and was not consistent with Department expectations. Their driving through red tri-lights without making an effort to slow or stop to ensure a safe passage, was a blatant disregard for their safety and public.”* In addition, these officers ran past the suspect's vehicle to engage in a foot pursuit without first clearing the suspect's vehicle. The OIG agreed with these classifications. The driver and three passengers in one of the vehicles struck by the suspect filed claims for injuries allegedly sustained during the crash, but the City denied the claims on December 17, 2024. To date, no lawsuits have been filed.

Pursuit No. 14 [DR No. 23-0912160, Inc. No. 230724003535]

On July 24, 2023, at approximately 1903 hours, officers located a suspected stolen vehicle in a parking lot after receiving a report that the victim had tracked the vehicle to the area. The officers attempted to conduct a stop, but the driver immediately sped away, reaching a speed of 60 mph on a commercial street. The officers activated their emergency lights and siren and initiated a pursuit. The pursuit traversed approximately 1/10th of a mile and lasted just 13 seconds, before the suspect drove into oncoming traffic, side-swiped a vehicle in the left turn lane, and collided with three other occupied vehicles. The suspect driver ran from the scene, resulting in a foot pursuit and use of force to arrest the driver for the stolen vehicle, felony evading, and illegal possession of a firearm. Officers arrested the passenger in the suspect vehicle without incident. A child, one of the six occupants in the four vehicles, sustained a broken jaw and lost a tooth from the crash. Because of the short duration, no other units joined the pursuit.

For both the driver and passenger of the primary (and only) unit, the Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action and the involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval – No Further Action. The adjudication noted that the short distance of the pursuit did not provide the officers an opportunity to terminate the pursuit. The watch commander noted that the suspect's erratic driving would have been a factor in terminating the pursuit; however, in this case, the balance test could not be applied due to the very short duration. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.

Pursuit No. 15 [DR No. 23-0515991, Inc. No. 231119003035]

On November 19, 2023, at approximately 1740 hours, three officers working in a single unit observed a vehicle driven and occupied by four underage occupants. The officers initiated a traffic stop because they believed the vehicle may be stolen based on the startled look on the occupants' faces when they passed the officers, the make and model of the vehicle (commonly stolen vehicle), and the area the vehicle was located. As the officers initiated a vehicle stop, the suspect refused to stop and sped away from the officers. Officers confirmed the vehicle was stolen and requested additional resources as they continued to pursue the vehicle. The suspect drove at high speeds through a residential area on the wrong side of road and failed to stop at multiple stop signs. The suspect then turned on to a main thoroughfare with moderate traffic and reached a speed of 75 mph before running a red light and crashing into two uninvolved vehicles. The suspect driver and one occupant in the suspect's vehicle each sustained a broken leg, and one of the uninvolved third parties sustained multiple fractured vertebrae.

The Department classified the pursuit initiation as In Policy – No Further Action, and the OIG agreed.

The Department classified the officers' involvement/tactics as Administrative Approval - Training, noting the officers did not verbally clear "several" stop sign-controlled intersections.

The Department concluded that the officers appropriately applied the balance test, but noted due to the property crime, the corresponding level of danger to the public necessary to cancel the pursuit was relatively low. Even though the Department concluded that the officers appropriately applied the balance test, the adjudication noted the officers could benefit from balance-test training. The OIG agreed with these classifications. No claims or lawsuits have been filed as a result of this pursuit and crash.